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AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, AND TRADITIONS
OF LIBERTY: THE CONTRAST OF
BRITISH AND AMERICAN
PRIVACY LAW
INTRODUCTION

I give the fight up: let there be an end,
A privacy, an obscure nook for me.
I want to be forgotten even by God.
-Robert

Browning1

Although most people do not wish to be forgotten "even by God,"
individuals do expect their community to refrain from intrusive regulation of the intimate aspects of their lives. Thus, the community must
strike a balance between legitimate community concerns and the individual's interest in personal autonomy. In free societies, the community ostensibly speaks through a popularly constituted government. Thus,
government protection of privacy rights is a measure of a society's commitment to liberty and, in a broader sense, autonomy. Privacy law reflects the tolerance of a nation. Although privacy is only one example of
2
autonomy, privacy rights are a substantial subset of personal autonomy.
Thus, examining privacy rights is one way to evaluate the general measure of liberty a society confers on its members.
But, even if one recognizes the need for privacy, the right of privacy
cannot be absolute. The existence of political community requires the
relinquishment of certain rights, prerogatives, and freedoms. 3 As John
Locke described, individuals must cede some rights and prerogatives that
1. Paracelsus,in 1 THE POEMS 118, 127 (J. Pettigrew ed. 1981).
2. The autonomy/privacy relation is a difficult matter. Privacy relates to personal autonomy,
but they are not coextensive. For example, autonomy would reach public acts such as one's public
dress or a speech given at a public gathering, acts that are not encompassed in any notion of privacy.
Yet, autonomy is vindicated through the protection of privacy in substantial ways. R. WAcKS, THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 12-13 (1980). For present purposes, one may take privacy to be a manifestation of personal autonomy (which in many societies is given either cultural or legal solicitude).
Although most "rights" can be couched in terms of privacy interests, see Gross, PrivacyandAutonomy, in PRIVACY 180-81 (. Pennock ed. 1971), whether freedom of speech and other public expressions of autonomy could be collapsed into the aegis of "privacy" is a matter best left aside for present
purposes.
3. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke make this point. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17-18,
129-41 (1962); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 87-99, at 366-77 (P. Laslett rev. ed.

1963).
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they otherwise could claim in a lawless state of nature: "Whosoever
therefore out of a state of Nature unite into a Community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they
unite into Society, to the majority of the Community... . 4 Nevertheless, democratic societies strive to maximize freedom while simultaneously ensuring the survival of the institutions that secure the liberties of
the people. Thus, individuals in democratic states expect. community
deference to some choices.5 The right of privacy is one way to articulate
this expectation of autonomy.
The United States and Great Britain have a long tradition of rule of
6
law. Although the United States and Great Britain share a common
legal background and hold many of the same assumptions regarding the
proper role of government, the two countries have parted ways on their
approaches to privacy law. This Note examines privacy law in Britain
and compares it to privacy law in the United States. Specifically, the
Note focuses on the institutional factors that have led Britain to reject
"privacy" as a useful legal construct for the vindication of certain liberty
7
interests.
A critique of the effectiveness of British governmental institutions in
protecting privacy highlights the underlying problem of community and
autonomy-the difficulty of squaring majoritarianism with individual
rights. Although Parliament occasionally has valued autonomy over
legal commands, the British institutional regime places too much faith in
the ability of a miajoritarian body to vindicate the rights of unpopular
minorities. As a result, the British system does not provide an effective
domestic process for individuals to redefine and broaden privacy rights in
favor of greater autonomy.
4. J. LocKE, supra note 3, § 99, at 377. The Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities has also noted this dilemma:
The requirements of life in a community and the fulfillment of the tasks incumbent on the
State may call for adjustments in the definition of that degree of freedom which the subjective right of the individual represents. To constitute violation of the right-it is not
enough that there should be any limitation whatever; the substance of the right must be
affected.
State v. Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 1185, 1209, [1976] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 552, 566.
5. From Locke's perspective, the vindication of these claims must, in some respects, be left to
institutional or majoritarian judgment. J.LOCKE, supra note 3, § 94, at 372-74.
6. From the time of Magna Carta, the British have prided themselves on being a people governed under law. Since its inception, the United States has claimed to vindicate the liberty interests
of its citizens by the rule of law.
7. See Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1979] 1 Ch. 334, 372-73 (Ch.) (court refuses
to create a right of privacy because of limited role British courts play in developing policy); R.
WACKs, supra note 2, at 21-23, 25, 176-180 (1980) (suggesting that "privacy" is a poor unifying
concept for discrete, independent, and identifiable interests).
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The United States also fails to vindicate important privacy interests.
Privacy law in the United States has suffered from serious definitional
problems. Although the Supreme Court has recognized autonomy interests under the Constitution, 8 it has failed to provide a clear and reliable
standard for identifying protected privacy rights. Thus, individuals in
the United States exercise privacy rights at their own risk. Recently, the
Supreme Court has superimposed narrow majoritarian preferences on
the exercise of autonomy rights 9 -a trend that undercuts privacy rights.
Those who value privacy-and hence autonomy-must demand that
government retain a province for individual choice.
Part I of this Note considers the nature of privacy and the problems
one encounters when trying to define the concept. Part II discusses domestic privacy law in Britain and details the efforts made to enact a general right of privacy for non-public action. Part II also considers the
extent to which article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 10 affords protection of privacy
rights and examines the interplay between article 8 and the British rejection of the right of privacy. Although domestic British law emphatically
rejects privacy as a useful legal construct for the delineation of autonomy
rights, article 8 guarantees a "right of privacy" to the citizens of the
United Kingdom. Part III briefly examines privacy law in the United
States to set a standard of comparison in order to better evaluate the
British approach. Part IV compares United States and British privacy
law and suggests explanations for the differences in the means chosen, if
not the ends reached, by each country. Finally, with this comparison in
mind, reforms for each system are suggested.
The analysis of British privacy law suggests that many privacy interests can be protected without formally vesting "privacy" rights in individuals. Nevertheless, the failure to provide individual citizens with a
forum to raise their autonomy claims can lead to the rejection of minority rights. The British could more effectively protect their citizens' privacy rights by incorporating the guarantees of the ECHR into their
domestic law."
An examination of the British approach to privacy also suggests that
the United States could more effectively protect legitimate privacy
claims. For instance, the Supreme Court needs to formulate a clear,
8. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965) (describing the penumbral
"zones of privacy" implied by the specific rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
9. See infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
10. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1955) [hereinafter ECHR].

11. See infra notes 101-07 & 171-73 and accompanying text.
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identifiable standard of review for privacy claims and apply it consistently. 12 The mere existence of a forum that hears claims against the government is of little value if individuals do not know what standards the
courts will use to evaluate such claims.
Ultimately, a just legal system should provide both certainty about
the scope of rights and a forum in which a citizen may raise a claim to
protect his rights. Both the United States and Britain are committed to
securing the privacy rights of their citizens; this Note attempts to show
how each country could better fulfill this goal.
I.

WHAT IS "PRIVACY?"

An initial problem with the study of privacy law is the concept of
privacy itself. Difficulties arise because privacy cannot be defined with
precision.1 3 According to J. B. Young, "[P]rivacy, like an elephant, is
perhaps more readily recognized than described." 14 The word "privacy"
contains emotive, subjective connotations that represent a variety of values and concerns embodied in a given culture. Further, because privacy
concerns are, in large part, defined in relation to a particular society at a
particular point in time, the concept itself is likely to evolve. 15
Despite the definitional difficulties, numerous courts and commentators have attempted to delineate the concept of privacy. They have de17
fined privacy as "the right to be let alone," 1 6 a right to act or not to act,
the right of control over disclosure of oneself,' or some amalgam of all
three. Privacy has also been equated with autonomy over certain aspects
12. See infra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
13. R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 1013.
14. Young, Introduction, in PRIVACY 2 (J. Young ed. 1978) [hereinafter PRIVACY]. Young's
introduction to his collection of essays on privacy is illuminating with respect to the philosophic and
linguistic difficulties one faces when discussing "privacy" interests.
15. See Report of the Committee On Privacy, 1972, CMND. No. 5012, at 23 [hereinafter
YOUNGER REPORT] (suggesting that the commuter on the rush-hour train experiences privacy as
anonymity, whereas his ancestors traveling on the open road experienced privacy as solitude). The
Committee Report also noted that notions of privacy varied from person to person. Id. at 5.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis'
formulation has been used as both an indictment and a justification for legally cognizable privacy
interests. See R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 12 ("a sweeping phrase which is as comprehensive as it is
vague"). But cf PRIVACY, supra note 14, at 2 ("an excellent short definition").
17. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (right to privacy is
givefi three formulations, all of which emphasize the individual privilege to act or to refrain from
acting).
18. See R. HIXsON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY 53 (1987); Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some
Arguments andAssumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 317
(F. Schoeman ed. 1984); see also R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 10-12 (discussing various formulations
of privacy). Gross, in defining privacy as two classes of personal matters, including "things which
tell us who a person is and what he's like," and matters pertaining to a person's life, offers the best
general definition of privacy. See Gross, supra note 2, at 172.
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of one's life. 19 As these examples suggest, no single theory of privacy can
capture all the nuances of the concept.
Formulating a comprehensive and exhaustive definition of privacy is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, a common definition of privacy
provides a necessary starting point-a datum-for any comparison of
two different legal systems. For the purposes of this Note, "privacy"
signifies a realm of individual autonomy in recognized and accepted social contexts. One need only assume that the people of both the United
States and Great Britain share enough of a common background to recognize that government regulation of individual choice often adversely
affects individual autonomy. Privacy rights in both countries derive not
only from case law and relevant statutes, but also from the culture's institutional and philosophic foundations. Legal culture shapes each nations'
determination of how much autonomy to grant the individual and the
best means suited to that end. 20 Even if we assume that each system of
government reflects the sensibilities of the people it governs, the effectiveness with which systems vindicate individual liberty remains open to
question.
II.

THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN GREAT BRITAIN

The right of privacy does not receive explicit recognition in English
law. 2 1 To the extent that privacy rights exist implicitly in Britain, they
are formulated quite differently than in the United States. Indeed, a popular treatise on privacy in Britain does not discuss freedom of choice in
the areas of sexuality, reproduction, or familial/parental relations. 22
Although British law does address these issues, they do not fall within
the rubric of privacy. As a result, privacy rights in Britain are a "patchwork affair."
Early judicial decisions and legislation lacked any notion of privacy. 23 This reflects, in part, a reservation of authority to make laws
regulating any aspect of community life. Additionally, British Govern19. See sources cited supra note 2.

20. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS,

FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

33-35

(1987) (attention to the context in which a legal system operates is a necessary prerequisite to understanding the system).
21. See Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRIVACY, supra note 14, at 115.
22. See R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 1-85. This work is interesting because of what it does not
address, i.e., sexuality and parenthood, as well as for what is addressed-nondisclosure of personal
information to the government or others. An older work presents a "survey of the present content of
civil liberties in England," but again, there is no mention of a "right of privacy" as such. H. STREET,
FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 9 (1963).

23. See W. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 60 (1979).
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ments resist any legal restrictions on the exercise of their powers. 24 Britain has also declined to adopt domestically the right of privacy
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Although
article 8 guarantees British citizens a right of privacy, Britain remains the
only signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, without a
law of privacy. 25 Thus, under domestic law, the individual citizen has no
guaranteed right to seek redress against intrusive government activity.
British citizens have seized upon the concept of privacy as a potential means to obtain judicial relief from unduly burdensome majoritarian
commands. Citizens have lobbied Parliament for the creation of a statutory right of privacy, 26 argued before the domestic British courts for the
enunciation of a common law right of privacy, 27 asked the British judiciary to apply article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms domestically,2 and ultimately, traveled to Strasbourg, France to obtain a hearing before an international human rights
court. 29 Unfortunately, these efforts to carve out an effective institutional
process to guarantee privacy interests have largely been unsuccessful.
Some external body may have to force parliamentary action. For instance, the Court of Justice of the European Community effectively could
compel the British government to recognize a right of privacy. But, in
the absence of external pressure, the prospects for reform are bleak.
24. The "Government" is composed of the ministers selected from the House of Commons and
the House of Lords. All of its members have seats in Parliament. Higgins, UnitedKingdom, in THE
EFCrT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 123-25 (F. Jacobs & S.Roberts eds. 1987). Critics have
noted that such a system does not promote democracy. See Mellors, Governments and the Individual-TheirSecrecy andHis Privacy, in PRIVACY, supra note 14, at 93. Mellors writes: "The truth is
that Britain has the weakest democratic constitution of any comparable country. It is not designed
to encourage a plurality of power bases within its executive. Its legislature is all but impotent. It is
the anchor of an over-powerful unitary state." See Rogaly, Why Britain Should Copy Germany,
Financial Times, July 13, 1990, § 1, at 16, col. 2; see also Atlas, ThatcherPutsA Lid on Censorshipin
Britain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, § 6 (magazine) at 36, col. 1 (describing the political and social
forces contributing to the debate over Charter 88, a manifesto descrying censorship in Britain under
Margaret Thatcher).
25. Scholars of the ECHR have lamented this state of affairs:
"[It is only in the UK, without the benefit of such incorporation by statute of the
E.C.H.R. or comparable provisions in a similar constitutional Bill of Rights, that an individual who relies exclusively on such a defined right guaranteed to him by his government
under the E.C.H.R. must have recourse to the Commission to vindicate it. Hence, it is not
surprising to observe that the UK has the unenviable record of having had more petitions
registered against it and more cases against it referred to the Court than any other member
state in the Council of Europe.
Dowrick, Council of Europe. JuristicActivity 1974-86, Part II, 36 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 878, 888
(1987). See J. FAWCETT, APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RGIrS 20

(1987);
26.
27.
28.
29.

Mellors, supra note 24, at 93.
See infra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 121-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
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Statutory Privacy Rights in Britain

The primary source of legal rights in Britain is statutory law. "Generalized rights" are not the norm in English law, 30 and the courts tend to
hew narrowly to established doctrines and to statutes adopted by Parliament. Respect for the supremacy of Parliament, 31 fear that rapid change
in the law will create uncertainty, 32 and a tendency to maintain a positivist jurisprudential outlook 33 preclude British judges from developing social policy. 34 These same factors also discourage judges from using
broad, nebulous legal constructs-such as privacy-to decide cases and
implement rights.
1. Unsuccessful Attempts to Create a Statutory Right of Privacy.
Perhaps the most disturbing characteristic of the British approach to privacy is the historical lack of parliamentary and judicial interest in the
protection of privacy rights. Although Parliament historically has approached privacy as a matter of relations between private persons and
between private persons and the press, 3 5 in recent years, back bench
30. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 266; YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15,
at 28. By "generalized rights" I mean rights that lack specific definition (privacy, freedom of speech,
due process of law, etc.) and rights that are not limited by a specific text.
31. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 42-53. Atiyah and Summer's book provides a theoretical and practical discussion of the systemic differences between the U.S. and British
legal systems.
32. See id.at 14243.
33. Id. at 421.
34. Street writes that:
Mhe British judge has trained himself as an umpire, avoiding clashes with the Government of the day, cutting himself off from politics whenever possible, and divesting his
judgments of social, economic, and political references to the utmost. This outlook has
made him unable to provide the kind of interpretation necessary for the written constitutions of other parts of the Commonwealth ....
H. STREET, supra note 22, at 286; see also YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 211.
35. See W. PRATr,supra note 23, at 128. Although individuals in Britain have viewed privacy
as encompassing more than protection from private parties, most of the early legislative reform
efforts focused only on this aspect. In the tort context, Parliament made three unsuccessful attempts
in the 1960s to legislate an action for invasion of privacy against non-governmental actors. Lord
Mancroft introduced a Privacy Bill on February 14, 1961 that provided for a right of action against
the press for stories published about individuals without their consent. R. WACKS, supra note 2, at
5-9. The Act was intended to discourage the public disclosure of private facts. See 229 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) 607-617 (1961).
Parliament has expressed concern for protecting freedom of the press over the individual's privacy interest. However, the extent of this concern is limited. The Official Secrets Act has been
invoked regularly against the British press in favor of the government's privacy interest. See R.
WAcKS, supra note 2, at 16-17. Ironically, a free press trumps an individual's privacy interest, but
not the government's privacy interest. For a British recognition of the general problem, see
YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 195-200.
In 1967 and 1969, bills that created a general privacy right against other private interests as well
as against the press were introduced. In 1967, the Lyon's Bill sought to define privacy as the right to
be let alone, stating that privacy was "the right of any person to preserve the seclusion of himself, his

Vol. 1990:1398]

BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRIVACY LAW

1405

members of Parliament have introduced several bills that would recog36
nize a more generalized notion of privacy.

In response to parliamentary support for a privacy act in the late

1960s, Parliament created the Committee on Privacy, chaired by Kenneth Younger. 37 The Younger Committee's mandate extended only to
private and quasi-private interference with individual privacy; specifi-

cally, it did not extend to governmental intrusions. 38 Nevertheless, the
committee's survey on the public's perception of privacy concluded that:
In identifying privacy with the state of being let alone to do as one
wished, most respondents appear[ed] to have been thinking primarily
of the dangers of interference with their liberty by a possible totalitarian government, an aspect [of privacy] which lies outside our terms of
reference, and only secondarily of preserving their privacy as a valued
element in the quality of life from
interference by non-governmental
39
bodies and their fellow citizens.
The Younger Committee reviewed the subject for three years before

concluding that Britain needed neither a general right of privacy nor a
specific tort action for the invasion of privacy. 4° The Committee found
that a general right of privacy against governmental and private interests
was incompatible with the concept of society. 4 1 The "right 'to be let
alone" was viewed as unreasonable in a community dedicated to com-

mon goals and purposes. 42 The Younger Committee's conclusions dovetail with the ambivalence of some British commentators to an Americanstyle right of privacy-both groups found that the benefits conferred by a
privacy construct are dubious at best.4 3
family, or his property, from any person." W. PRATr, supra note 23, at 161. Lyon's bill did not
focus on the press, nor did it target governmental invasions of privacy. Instead, Lyon wanted to
extend the individual's privacy interest to reach material gathered by other private individuals or
groups via new technologies. Id. at 162. No action was taken on Lyon's bill. In 1968 and 1969, a
movement to establish an English Bill of Rights with a privacy clause was defeated. Concerns over
the creation of an ill-defined cause of action and over the possible limitations on freedom of the press
prevented passage. Id. at 169. A third bill, the Walden Bill of 1969, would have created a privacy
tort through the use of a general definition of privacy that enumerated infringements, defenses, and
examples. See W. PRATt, supra note 23, at 180. Although the Walden Bill did not draw tremendous support, it did induce the Government to create a committee on privacy.
36. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
37. See W. PRATT,supra note 23, at 183-84.
38. YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 200-05.
41. See Mellors, supra note 24, at 90.
42. YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 10.
43. R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 21-23. The British view American privacy law with much
skepticism. Consider the Younger Committee's appraisal of the then new decisions in the Griswold

line:
The decisions, backed by some statements in the Constitution, justify the conclusion that
privacy itself is widely recognized as a legally defensible right in the United States, but not
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The Younger Committee hearings and report stimulated much debate, but no legislative action. 44 Despite this setback, the privacy debate
continued in Britain. In the 1988-89 session of Parliament, M.P.s John
Browne and Tony Worthington introduced bills to guarantee a right of
privacy and a right of reply, both to run only against the press. 45 In
46
response, the Government constituted a second committee on privacy.
The Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (the Calcutt Committee) issued its final report in June 1990. But once again the privacy committee's terms of reference limited its investigations to non-governmental
intrusions of privacy.4 7
The Calcutt Committee concluded that tort law did not need a right
of privacy cause of action. 48 The difficulty in defining privacy did not
lead to the rejection of the tort. Rather, the uncertainty with regard to
the effect of such a tort on the ability of the press to function produced
the committee's rejection. 49
The current Government does not appear ready to address the fundamental problem with British law: the lack of a right of privacy that
can be asserted against the state. The Calcutt Committee Report merely
that it is established as a coherent principle of law or that is has significantly contributed to
respect for privacy in every-day life, especially by the mass publicity media.
YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 30. Coherence in a principle of law is certainly desirable;
nevertheless some interests may not fit neatly with other interests or lend themselves to easy application in specific cases. See Rogaly, supra note 24.
44. W. PRATr, supra note 23, at 203.
45. See REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, CMND. No.
1102, at 1 (1990) (Chairman: David Calcutt, Q.C.) [hereinafter Calcutt Committee Report].
The Committee also was organized in response to perceived abuses by the popular pressspecifically, an incident in which reporters from the Sunday Sport barged into a popular actor's
hospital room in order to report on his condition. See Snoddy, The Press on A SlipperySlope, Financial Times, June 23, 1990, § I at col. 1. The case of Gordon Kiye, the actor, prompted the committee to recommend a new criminal law. Id.
46. Calcutt Committee Report, supra note 45, at 1.
47. The Calcutt Committee Report noted:
A number of those who submitted evidence to us argued that our terms of reference were
too narrowly drawn; some urged us to extend our inquiries to include official secrets, data
protection, computer hacking, and telephone tapping. While we recognize that all these
issues may be relevant to individual privacy, they do not generally concern intrusion by the
press.
Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 46.
49. The supreme irony of the Calcutt Committee Report occurred when the Committee referenced articles of the ECHR and suggested that the individual's interest in privacy should be balanced against the community's interest in a free press. Id. at 7-8, 13. The irony is that the ECHR
applies first and foremost against government action. Thus, the Calcutt Committee used a prohibition on government interference to attempt to justify restrictions on a private actor-the press. See
infra note 99 and accompanying text. Although private activity may trigger provisions of the
ECHR, the primary focus of the ECHR's restrictions is on government infringements of basic civil
liberties. See P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13-18, 310 (1984).
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provides additional evidence and an interesting example of this
shortcoming.
2. Explicit Recognition and Rejection of Privacy Rights by Parliament. Despite the lack of a written constitution and the failure of Parliament to enact privacy legislation, British citizens are not entirely
without remedies for invasions of privacy. In many respects, a different
approach rather than any difference in substance separates Britain and
the United States with regard to privacy rights. Although Parliament
has never enacted a Privacy Act, it indirectly has created distinct privacy
rights in a number of areas. In some cases, these parliamentary laws
grant broader coverage for individual freedom of action than the American "right of privacy."
Britain's approach demonstrates that a majoritarian body sometimes
can adequately resolve the tension between individual liberty and community.50 In contexts in which a majoritarian consensus exists, Parliament has granted autonomous decisionmaking to the individual.
Sodomy, prostitution, abortion, and data protection provide several
examples. 5 '
a. Statutory recognition of autonomy interests. Parliament has
recognized several autonomy interests by statute. First, in contrast to
many states in the United States, the British Sexual Offences Act allows
homosexual sodomy in the home provided that the act is not engaged in
for monetary gain. 52 The British approach to the problem of prostitution
50. Britain's approach is in keeping with the contentions of some current U.S. Supreme Court
Justices' that the tension between individual liberty and community moral values is best resolved by
majoritarian legislative bodies. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-30 (1989). Justice
Scalia takes the position that tradition, usually enunciated best by the legislatures, should guide the
delimitation of privacy interests. But although legislatures are accountable to some extent, they
often are unwilling to tackle issues because of a fear of adverse reaction by a vocal plurality of the
voters.
51. See infra notes 52, 55-61 and accompanying text; see also P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 20, at 299-306. The party system in Great Britain makes it possible for a Member of Parliament
(MP) to vote for a bill that is repugnant to his constituency and remain in office. Id. at 302-03. If
the party decides to take an unpopular stand, then the party itself eventually will be held accountable, but individual members will not immediately feel the wrath of the public. Id. at 303.
Public sanction of individual parliamentary acts is, at least in some cases, only indirect, if it
exists at all. Thus, even though the election of Parliament is an expression of majoritarian desires,
the acts of the body do not necessarily always coincide with public opinion. Conversation with P.S.
Atiyah, in Durham, North Carolina (March 22, 1989).
52. Sexual Offences Act, 1967, ch. 60 § 1. Conversely, the Supreme Court of the United States
refused to grant the act of sodomy constitutional protection. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). Although Britain legalized consensual homosexual conduct, the British approach is not terribly deferential to the individual interests when determining whether or not to occupy a given field
legislatively. See infra notes 265-73.
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provides a second illustration. Rather than criminalize payment for sexual favors, the British regulate only public solicitation and pimping.5 3
Prostitution itself is not illegal; Britain has recognized that it is unrealistic, and perhaps unsafe, to maintain a prudish attitude in light of society's long practice. Abortion, however, provides the best example of an
area in which Parliament has acted to secure an autonomy interest commonly associated with the right of privacy.
Theoretically, the right to abortion enjoys less protection in Britain
than in the United States. Whereas in the United States a "right of privacy" protects a woman's "fundamental liberty" to decide whether or
not to abort her fetus, 54 the British Abortion Act generally criminalizes
abortion in Britain. In practice, however, the Act's exception clause
swallows the whole by allowing legal abortions for the physical and
mental well-being of the mother or of existing children and for deformed
fetuses.5 5 By liberally construing this provision, the courts, with Parliament's tacit approval, effectively have created abortion on demand.5 6
Pro-life advocates in Britain have challenged this interpretation of
the Act. In Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v. Department of Health and SocialSecurity,5 7 the House of Lords rejected a petition by pro-life nurses arguing that a literal reading of the statute's
requirement for "termina[tion] by a registered medical practitioner"5 8 required doctors to personally administer a drug resulting in miscarriage in
eighteen to twenty hours. 59 Royal College is just one example of unsuccessful efforts to restrict defacto abortion on demand. The de facto statutory right to an abortion also has been protected against challenges
based on the Infant Life Protection Act, and against challenges by fathers and other outsiders. 60 The message to be gleaned from these cases is
that only the state has standing to enjoin an abortion operation. 61
53. Street Offenses Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz., ch. 57, §§ 1-4. One of the ironies of this policy is that

men cannot be punished for paying for sex, while women can still go to jail for solicitation.
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see infra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
55. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 1.
56. See Ryan, Rights That Go Awry, London Times, Aug. 23, 1990, at 8, col. 2 (David Steel's
Abortion Act "was a classic piece of compromise legislation. It declared abortion criminal except in
some situations." The result allows abortions in the same circumstances which the U.S. Supreme

Court granted women a constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. 1981 App. Cas. 800 (H.L.).
58. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, § 1; see 1981 App. Cas. 800, 828 (H.L.) (discussing the statutory language).
59. Lord Denning on the Court of Appeal had rigidly applied the provision as the nurses requested, commenting that he doubted Parliament would amend the law so as to allow de minimis
supervision. Id at 806-07 (C.A.).

60. Grubb & Pearl, Protectingthe Life of the Unborn Child, 103 L.Q. REv. 340, 340 (1987).
61. Id. at 342.
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The British government's position seems to be that abortion does
not implicate a sufficient governmental concern to justify a government
proscription against it. However, Parliament's deference to a woman's
decision whether to have an abortion has not led to general discussions of
rights of privacy. Rather, British citizens appear to rely on a principle of
governmental self-restraint coupled with a notion of liberty vesting in the
citizenry-that which Parliament does not prohibit is permitted. 62 Thus,
privacy is "protected" via indifference or deliberate inaction. However,
no procedure exists to prevent Parliament from legislating in areas that
impinge on privacy: Individual autonomy is subject to summary abrogation by parliamentary fiat.
A final example of the protection of limited privacy interests by statute is the Data Protection Act of 1984, which regulates the collection
and dissemination of computer data.63 The Act guarantees an individual
the right to access a computer database that contains information about
him. 64 Parliament accomplished this goal by requiring firms collecting
personal information on computer databases to comply with registration
and reporting requirements. The Act, although comprehensive within its
area of application, contains an exception for the government when "national security" is implicated. 65 Similar to acts passed by the United
States Congress in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 66 the Data Protection
Act protects personal information-furthering privacy-but it does not
directly relate to individual autonomy. The Data Protection Act, the
Abortion Act, and the Sexual Offences Act are examples of Parliament's
willingness to protect privacy in certain cases.
b. Parliament sometimes fails to protect some privacy interests
where the powers of government are directly in question. When the government wishes to restrict an individual's freedom, or to shield itself from
public scrutiny, British law grants individual citizens little recourse.
Although Parliament has been quite permissive on privacy issues relating
to abortion, homosexuality, and prostitution, it has been somewhat neanderthal in the areas of official government secrets and search and seizure
law. The following examples illustrate this problem.
With regard to search and seizure, the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act grants broad power to arresting officers to search houses without a
62. H. STREET, supra note 22, at 10, 284.'
63. Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35, §§ 1-3.

64. Id. § 21(1).
65. Id. § 27(1).
66. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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warrant. 67 Although section four of this Act limits searches to the subject matter of the entry, this is of little consolation to one whose bedroom
is ransacked. 6 8 Thus, privacy in the home is tenuous under the present
state of the law-and is always subject to complete revocation by
69
Parliament.
Even when Parliament acts to protect privacy, parliamentary reforms are often minimal. In 1985, responding to Malone v. Metropolitan
Police Commissioner,70 Parliament adopted the Interception of Communications Act, 7 1 which protected some privacy interests through procedural reforms. Prior to the 1985 Act, judicial review of government
67. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 17. In contrast, in the United States a
general search may not be conducted absent a warrant describing the items to be taken. Even in the
United States there are exceptions-such as the "plain sight" rule-to the prohibition against general searches. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-67 (1971) (items in plain view
may justify taking relevant evidence not listed in a warrant, but doctrine may not be used to justify a
general "exploratory" search with or without a warrant); M. ABERNATHY, CIVIL LIBERTIEs
UNDER THE CONsTITUTION 83-109 (5th ed. 1989); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 169, at 479-81 (E.
Cleary 3d. ed. 1984).
68. However, local police are not immune from tort law, unless Parliament specifically vitiates
such liability. See Morris v. Beardmore, 1981 App. Cas. 446 (H.L.) (constable who entered home
during unlawful search in drunk driving investigation civilly liable for trespass); H. STREET, supra
note 22, at 12-32. Similarly, in the United States, local police officers are held accountable for their
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and federal officers through the Bivens doctrine. For a discussion of section 1983, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961). For the extension of constitutional torts to searches by'federal agents, see Bivens v. Six Federal Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The principle difference between the United States and Britain on imposing liabilities on law
enforcement personnel is that Parliament may vitiate liability at will, whereas the Congress would
presumably be limited by the federal Constitution-Congress could not authorize unconstitutional
conduct by state or federal agents.
69. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
70. [1979] 1 Ch. 344 (Ch.). Malone itself concerned the police practice of wiretapping and
"metering" without any independent judicial or administrative supervision. Id. at 368. "Metering"
is the recording of incoming and outgoing phone numbers, and not an actual recording of the conversations. Under the then-existing legislation, the local constables were free to monitor or meter
phones with a minister's approval. Id The legislation did not provide for any judicial oversight. Id.
at 368-69. See 1 V. BERGER, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 19601987 at 255-60 (1989) (procedural history of the Malone case). Great Britain did not reform its
domestic surveillance laws until called to task by the ECHR (sometimes referred to as the Strasbourg court). V. BERGER, supra, at 257, 260. The European Commission of Human Rights declared Malone's application to the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter European Court)
admissible in 1981, Malone v. United Kingdom, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 330, 349 (1981), and
the European Court of Human Rights heard and decided the case. Malone v. United Kingdom,
[1985] 7 Eur. Hum. Rghts. Rep. 14 (1984); V. BERGER, supra, at 258-60. The European Court
found that Britain's failure to regulate government interception of private communications violated
article 8. Malone, 7 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. at 41-47. Ultimately, a friendly settlement was reached
between the parties; Britain passed the Interception of Communications Act, 1985, ch. 56 and paid £
18,000 for his legal costs and damages. V. BERGER, supra, at 260. The Malone case is an example of
the good that can result when individuals pursue their claims in the European Court of Human
Rights. See infra notes 151-67 and accompanying text.
71. Interception of Communications Act of 1985, ch. 56.
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wiretaps was not required before the government could monitor private
conversations. The 1985 Act, however, did not create or recognize a

right of privacy in the citizenry. Rather, the Act redrew the rules relating to the interception of private communications by government officials. The Act required judicial supervision of wiretaps and delimited the
72
circumstances in which such a warrant could be issued.
The Interception of Communications Act vindicates the individual's
privacy interest only in the most limited contexts. The Act shows that
Parliament can protect privacy in limited contexts against arbitrary gov-

ernment action when required to do so.73 It also illustrates that privacy,
as a general matter, will remain largely unprotected.

B. The Role of the British Judiciary in Securing Privacy Rights
In contrast to United States courts, the British courts consistently

refuse to recognize or create a right of privacy in any context. British
judges believe it is "no function of the courts to legislate in a new field." 74
72. Government agents are immune from liability, provided that they were acting in a matter
authorized pursuant to section two of the Act, which provides that:
(2) The Secretary of State shall not issue a warrant under this section unless he considers
that the warrant is necessary(a) in the interests of national security;
(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or
(c)for the purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.
Additionally, a Commissioner provides governmental oversight and has the duty to inform the
Prime Minister of any suspect interceptions by the government. Finally, the courts are charged with
ensuring compliance with the Act. Interception of Communications Act, 1985, ch. 56, § 8. The
provisions of the Act protecting citizens from government surveillance of their correspondence are
entirely consistent with Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1979-80] 2 Eur. Hum Rts. Rep. 214
(1978), in which the European Court allowed West Germany to intercept communications under a
stringent administrative scheme, even thought the scheme did not involve direct judicial review.
73. Parliament did not pass the Act spontaneously. Rather, an external body precipitated reform of government surveillance of the citizenry. In Malone, the European Court of Human Rights
(European Court) found that the government of Great Britain violated the right of privacy guaranteed by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, the Interception of Communications Act, unsurprisingly, tracks the permissible exceptions to the right of privacy provided in
article 8(2). ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8(2), at 230. The allowable exceptions relate to "national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others." The general notes to section 2 of the Interception of Communications Act note that the
wording of the section "also reflect the wording of Article eight of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." Explanatory notes, Interception of
Communications Act, 1985, ch. 56, in 45 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 419
(4th ed. 1988).
74. Malone, [1979] 1 Ch. at 372. However, there is popular sentiment for the creation of such a
right by the domestic British courts. See, e.g., Justinian, Establishing the Right to Be Left Alone,
FINANCIAL TInMES,Mar. 26, 1990, § 1, at 40, col. 2 ('IT]here is a strong argument for letting the law
grow out of a series of rulings in individual cases. The judges' riposte to the suggestion that they
should construct a law of privacy is that it is too late in the day for the courts to create new
remedies.").

1412

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Val, 1990:1398

Because the British courts see legal reform as the prerogative of Parliament, it would be anomalous for them to unilaterally create a right of
privacy.
1. The British Judiciary Will Not Recognize A Right of Privacy in
the Common Law. British citizens, in light of Parliament's inaction,
have attempted to circumvent the legislature by petitioning the British
courts to create a common law right of privacy. Without fail, the courts
have refused to do so. One route sought to secure a common law right of
privacy was through the extension of the torts of breach of confidence
and trespass. For instance, in Directorof Public Prosecutionsv. Withers,
Lord Simon 75 declined to recognize the tort of invasion of privacy.7 6
Although he admitted that the tort arguably could be derived from the
tort of breach of confidence, the Lord believed that court action would be
inappropriate because Parliament was studying the issue. Ultimately,
Parliament took no action, and in the late 1970s the issue of a common
law right of privacy remained before the courts.
Article 8 of the ECHR presented a second route to a common law
right of privacy through judicial action. However, the courts rejected
article 8 as a source for establishing a common law right of privacy. The
Malone case 77 effectively foreclosed the development of a common law
right of privacy in domestic British law. Malone expressed the judiciary's determination to avoid the creation of a general right of privacy:
No new right in the law, fully-fledged with all the appropriate safeguards, can spring from the head of a judge deciding a particular case:
only Parliament can create such a right.... One of the factors that
must be relevant in such a case is the degree of particularity in the
right that is claimed. The wider and more indefinite the right claimed,
the greater the undesirability of holding that such a right exists. 7 8
Although much English case law, as well as provisions of the European
Convention on Human Rights and the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, was argued in support of a common law right of privacy, Sir
Megarry concluded, "I can find nothing in the authorities or contentions
75. A "law lord" is a member of the House of Lords who is appointed for life (he or she is not a
member of the peerage) and who sits in decision over the appeals taken from the lower British
judiciary. The House of Lords, as a whole, does not sit and decide cases. Rather, the small cadre of
law lords discharge this function. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 269.

76. 1975 App. Cas. 842, 862-63 (H.L.). See also Berstein of Leigh (Baron) v. Skyviews &
General Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 479, 488 (Q.B.) (no remedy for breach of privacy unless plaintiff can
establish the elements of an already recognized tort).
77. [1979] 1 Ch. 344. The Chancery Division upheld police attempts to gather evidence for a
possible prosecution against Malone. Because British domestic law did not recognize any privacy
right, Malone did not appeal the privacy issues to either the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords.
Malone v. United Kingdom, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 330, 337-38 (1981).
78. Malone, [1979] 1 Ch. at 372-73.
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that have been put before me to support the plaintiff's claim based on the
' 79
right of privacy."
One last example illustrates that the British courts will defer to Parliamentary commands, no matter how invasive to individual privacy.
Regina v. Inland Revenue Commission, ex parte Rossminster provides an
example of this phenomenon.80 Rossminster involved government
searches to enforce criminal tax fraud and answered the basic question of
how far the government could go to collect its revenues. 81 According to
the House of Lords, the government could go quite far indeed: The
Lords found that the government may search homes and businesses with
very general warrants.8 2 The House of Lords simply gave effect to a
broadly crafted law duly adopted by Parliament. Because the law did

not require that a warrant issued under the act specify the authority
under which it was issued or the items which could be seized, no such
requirements would be implied by the House of Lords. Thus, as long as

the government's activity is expressly authorized by Parliament, no claim
of privacy under the common law (guaranteed primarily by the tort of

trespass) may 3 stand in the way of state action based on the
8

authorization.
2.

The Recognition of the Notion of Privacy by the British Courts

Via Statutory Interpretation. Although the judiciary refused to recognize a general right of privacy absent legislative authority, it will not
79. Id. at 375. With respect to article 8 in particular, the court observed that the domestic
courts of England do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims that arise under the ECHR and
that the ECHR is not part of the domestic law of Britain. See infra notes 121-36 and accompanying
text.
80. 1980 App. Cas. 952 (C.A.).
81. Id. at 969-71. Petitioners premises were searched by tax agents under a general warrant
that did not specify any offense. Id at 1015-16. On July 12, 1979, four warrants were issued under
section 20C of the Taxes Management Act, 1970, ch. 9, as substituted by the Finance Act, 1976, ch.
40, sched. 6, for the search of two private homes and two businesses. Id at 997, 1001. The warrant,
consistent with section 20C, authorized the police to search the named premises and "seize and
remove any things whatsoever found there which you have reasonable cause to believe may be required as evidence for the purposes of proceedings in respect of [a criminal revenue offence]." Id. at
1003. Lord Salmon would have upheld the result reached in the Court of Appeal, but on much
narrower grounds than Lord Denning advocated. Id. at 1017-18.
82. The Act did not require the warrant to specifically state the iems to be taken-it authorized
a general search. Rossminster, 1980 App. Cas. at 1003-04. Further, section 20C(3) authorized the
general seizure of any evidence the executing officer believed might be helpful to the government's
case. Id. at 1005.
83. Despite the contemporary British courts unsympathetic view toward the creation of a general privacy right, individual judges have been quite impressed with the arguments advanced in favor
of such a right. In particular, Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, was quite ready to recognize a
privacy right in Rossminster. He wrote: "A good end does not justify a bad means. The means
must not be such as to offend against the personal freedom, the privacy and the elemental rights of
property." Id. at 976.
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protect government officials from liability for illegal conduct in the absence of express parliamentary approval. The British judiciary applies a
notion of privacy as a general principle of statutory construction.8 4 Principles of statutory construction can provide some modicum of protection
for privacy interests.
Morris v. Beardmore provides an example of British courts applying
this notion of privacy.8 5 In Morris, a gentleman involved in an accident
left the scene of the incident and returned home. Over two hours later,
local police arrived at his home and asked to speak with him. When Mr.
Morris refused, the police broke into his house and demanded that he
submit to a breathalyzer test (that he failed). The House of Lords decided the question as whether the police conduct was justified under a
general statute for the enforcement of drunk driving laws. 8 6 The Lords
decided in favor of Morris based on a principle of statutory construction:
Parliament is required to expressly authorize official tortious conduct in
order to preempt otherwise applicable common law liability for govern87
ment officials.
In this case, Lord Edmund-Davies nearly articulated a general notion, although not a "right," of privacy: "[T]o reject the appeal would
entitle a constable who, in deliberate violation of the householder's
rights, forcibly invades his privacy [to conduct a search].... I cannot
accept that Parliament contemplated anything of this sort." 88 Lord Edmund-Davies recognized that parliamentary inaction, by itself, does not
justify undue interference with privacy interests that otherwise are protected (albeit indirectly) through tort law.
Other opinions in Morris were equally solicitous toward a notion of
privacy. For instance, the speech of Lord Scarman in Morris is intriguing for its similarities to American judicial privacy law: 89
84. Malone v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1979] 1 Ch. 344, 380-81 (Ch.) (Sir Megarry, in
dicta, says that he personally would welcome parliamentary reform, but that it is not the court's
prerogative to create a new right). The Vice Chancellor's approach is consistent with the general

deference given to Parliament by the Courts. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 22729.

85. 1981 App. Cas. 446 (H.L.).
86. Id,at 453-54.
87. Id. at 456. "The presumption is that in the absence of express provision to the contrary
Parliament did not intend to authorize tortious conduct; and this presumption, in my view, owes
nothing to the European Convention on Human Rights .... Id. (Lord Diplock). The Lords did
not want to rest their holding on the ECHR, because to do so would make the ECHR operational at
the domestic level. See infra notes 121-50 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 461-62 (Lord Edmund-Davies).
89. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 502 (1976) (discussing the risks involved in protecting substantive liberties not specifically in the Bill of Rights).

Vol. 1990:1398]

BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRIVACY LAW

1415

I have deliberately used an adjective with which has an unfamiliar ring
to the ears of common law lawyers. I have described the right of privacy as "fundamental." I do so for two reasons. First, it is apt to
describe the importance attached by the common law to the privacy of
the home.... Secondly, the right enjoys the protection of the European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... which the United Kingdom ratified .... 90
Yet Lord Scarman spoke only in the context of a case in which Parliament's intent was ambiguous. If Parliament had expressly authorized
the objectionable police conduct, then the reliance on private tort law to
protect Morris' privacy would be unavailing. 9 1 Such references to privacy as a "fundamental right" indicate a sympathy among the British
judiciary for privacy concerns. Nevertheless, the judiciary remains unwilling to undertake unilateral action to protect privacy. 92 The ultimate
result, to American eyes, is unsatisfactory. British courts lament that
privacy concerns are legitimate, but only apply the notion of privacy at
the margins (if at all).
The courts vindicate privacy interests only when Parliament has affirmatively endorsed the interest or has left some ambiguity in an authorization of intrusive conduct. If privacy concerns are legitimate, then the
courts should have a greater role in securing them. The common law is
not static; if the courts can create an action for trespass, they could also
create a right to be let alone.
C. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms As a Source of a Right of Privacy
The failure of British domestic law to recognize a right of privacy
does not foreclose its existence altogether. The European Convention on
Human Rights guarantees a right of privacy to individual citizens against
the governments of signatory states, which include Britain. 93 Because
Parliament has refused to give the ECHR domestic effect, British courts
do not vindicate the individual autonomy rights recognized under the
94
ECHR.
90. Id. at 464.
91. See infra notes 121-67 and accompanying text.
92. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 228-29, 238, 269.
93. Article 25 of the ECHR limits the jurisdiction of the European Commission to the individ-

ual complaints of those seeking to vindicate rights guaranteed by the ECHR brought against states
that recognize the authority of the Commission. P. VAN DUK & G. vAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 6971. Article 46(1) requires the consent of states to the jurisdiction of the European Court. Presuma-

bly, signatories must accede to both in order to be subject to mandatory commands from the institutions of the ECHR. ECHR, supra note 10, at 246. However, article 24 allows for the Commission

to hear complaints brought by other signatory states without an article 25 declaration. Id. at 236.
94. The British record before the European Court is abysmal. From 1983 to 1985, 392 complaints were filed with the Commission against the U.K. compared to France with 174, the Federal
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1. Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Following the end of

World War II, the nations of Western Europe wanted to create an international framework to safeguard certain basic human freedoms against
government infringement. 95 Acting under the auspices of the Council of
Europe, a convention was drafted in 1950 and the European Convention
On Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) became effective on September 3, 1953.96 Today, the Council of Europe consists of
the twenty-one post World War II democracies of Western Europe. 97
The ECHR creates two bodies independent of the regular agencies
of the Council of Europe: the European Commission on Human

Rights 98 and the European Court of Human Rights. 99 Together with the
Republic of Germany with 312, and Italy with 91. Dowrick, supra note 25, at 888 n.48. Since 1959,
when the European Court began hearing cases, 27 U.K. cases have been referred by the Commission.
Id at 888 n.49. The numbers for other signatories with Britain's population were France (1), Federal Republic of Germany (16), and Italy (12). Britain's record of adverse judgements is also particularly poor. Id. See Higgins, United Kingdom, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW
123, 130 (F. Jacobs & S. Roberts eds. 1987).
Britain's ability to fulfill its international obligations as a signatory to the ECHR are seriously
tested by the absence of a legally cognizable privacy right. See infra note 123; Ryan, supra note 56,
at 8, col. I (British record before the European Court is poor). The Liberal Democratic Party recently has proposed incorporating the ECHR into British domestic law and establishing a United
Kingdom Commission on Human Rights. See Hibbs, First Written Constitution Proposed, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, July 6, 1990, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
95. P. vAN DIsK & G. VAN HooF, supra note 49, at 1-2.
96. Id
97. The following states are members of the Council of Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom. Id In 1990, Hungary became the first of the newly liberated East Bloc nations
to join the Council of Europe. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1990, § A, at 15, col. 1.
Distinct from the European Economic Community (EEC), which has only 12 members, the
Council of Europe is not a supranational organization, but rather is an intergovernmental entity.
The basic distinction is that the ECHR establishes an international organization, not a quasi-sovereign body. The EEC may directly displace domestic laws that conflict with policies of the EEC. See
e.g., Re Detergents Directive: E. C. Commission v. Italy, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1099, 1104-06,
[1981] 1 Common Mkt. L. R. 331, 342-43 (Ct. J.) (Italy violated article 169 of the Treaty of Rome
by failing to bring its domestic law in line with Council Directive 73/404). The ECHR, on the other
hand, does not vest the enforcement agencies with any power to act directly on the member states.
See Bartsch, The Implementation of Treaties Concluded with Council ofEurope, in THE EFFECT O
TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 197, 199 (F. Jacobs & S. Roberts eds. 1987). Thus, the Council of
Europe lacks plenary power to alter the domestic laws of the member states.
98. The European Commission of Human Rights examines complaints that are filed in a timely
fashion. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 19, at 235; P. vAN DISK & G. VAN HoOw, supra note 49, at 1823. The Commission receives complaints, determines their sufficiency, and attempts to negotiate a
"friendly settlement." P. VAN DIUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 91-92. For the requirements
of a valid petition, see articles 26-28 of the ECHR supra note 10, at 238-40. See also, J. FAWCETT,
supra note 25, at 355-75; P. VAN DIK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 53-91; Boyle, Practiceand
Procedure on IndividualApplications under the European Convention on Human Rights, in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 136-47 (H. Hannun ed. 1984).
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Council of Ministers, 1°° these bodies handle the day-to-day administration of the ECHR.
The ECHR, unlike many human rights conventions, effectively
secures the rights guaranteed under its provisions. 10 1 Although the European Court cannot force member states to comply with its decisions,
compliance with its judgments is the norm. 10 2
Article 1 of the ECHR requires that signatories' domestic laws be
consistent with the substantive guarantees of the ECHR. l0 3 Signatories
can comply with article 1 either by incorporating the treaty directly into
their domestic laws or by recognizing parallel rights under domestic
law.' °4 In fact, all but six signatories10 5 give domestic effect to the treaty
99. Articles 48 and 49 of the ECHR set out the jurisdiction of the European Court. ECHR,
supra note 10, at 246-48. Under article 47, the Court may take a case only after the Commission has
failed to reach a friendly settlement. Id at 246. A dispute may be referred to the Court by 1) the
Commission, 2) a contracting state whose national is the alleged victim, 3) a contracting state who
referred the case to the Commission initially, or 4) the contracting state against whom the complaint
is lodged. Id. art. 48, at 246. See P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 111-29; Boyle,
supra note 98, at 137. In practice, most complaints that are judged to be admissible by the Commission ultimately appear before the European Court. Boyle, supra note 98, at 14849. Member states
are required to bring their laws into conformity with the decisions handed down by the European
Court of Human Rights. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 53, at 248; Bartsch, supra note 97, at 199. For
a general discussion of the obligations of a member state to implement a decision of the European
Court, see J. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW By THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTs 11-19 (1988). Signatory states are obligated to secure the rights of the
ECHR under articles 1, 5(5), and 13. ECHR, supra note 10, at 224, 228, 232. They are bound by
decisions of the Council bodies by articles 32(4) and 53. Id. at 242, 248. Signatories must report
their compliance measures when so requested under article 57. Id. at 250.
100. The Committee of Ministers is a third branch of the ECHR, but has duties unrelated to the
ECHR. P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HooF, supra note 49, at 27-29.
101. Id. at 456.
102. Dowrick writes that: "Following an adverse judgement, defendant states have without exception eventually fulfilled their international obligations and complied with its terms, via executive
measures which can be more rapidly effected, or by national legislation which may take years."
Dowrick, supra note 25, at 889. See also, Waldock, The Effectiveness of the System Set Up By the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1 HUM. R'rs. L.J. 1 (1980) (success and effectiveness of
Convention possible only through interpretations in domestic law consistent with intent of convention). Professor Rusen Ergee has suggested that the high visibility of the decisions of the court in the
European media helped secure the compliance of member states. Conversation with R. Ergec, Professor at Free University of Belgium, Copenhagen, Denmark (July 29, 1989); P. VAN DUK & G.
VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 455-60; Boyle, supra note 98, at 149-50.
103. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 1, at 224; P. VAN DJK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 3,
377-78.
104. Under the ECHR a complainant must exhaust all effective domestic remedies before bringing his complaint before the European Commission. ECHR, supra note 10, arts. 26, 27(3), at 238.

See F. CASTBERG,

THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 40,43

(1974); J.

FAWCETr,

supra note 25, at 355-62, 368. However, remedies that are certain to be ineffective need not be
pursued. See P. VAN DIsK & G. VAN HooF, supra note 49, at 74-75. On the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies before pursuing a claim at the international level, see Claim of Finnish Shipowners, (Finland v. Great Britain) 3 U.N. R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1479 (1934) (Finland could bring
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itself.10 6 Britain has not incorporated the ECHR itself, and has not created domestic law analogues to all the rights guaranteed by the ECHR.
Britain's failure to give domestic effect to the ECHR or provide domestic
law alternatives means that an individual may argue rights under the
ECHR before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but
that Britain's domestic courts are not required to consider any arguments
directly arising under the ECHR. 10 7
2. PrivacyRights Protectedby the ECHR. Article 8 of the ECHR
secures a right of privacy in the home, family, and correspondence. Specifically, article 8 of the ECHR provides:
(1) Everyone has a right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.' 0 8
The European Court of Human Rights has given article 8 a broad reading. 0 9 Article 8 has been used to vindicate privacy rights in the home, 110
claim in international legal forum for unauthorized use of Finnish ships by Great Britain during
World War I since remedies in British War Compensation Court no longer available).
105. Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. J. FAWCErr, supra
note 25, at 5-21. But cf A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DoMESTic LAW 304-22 (1983) (Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden,
and United Kingdom do not accord ECHR domestic status). Nevertheless, a signatory state may
assert that the substance of its domestic law is in compliance with the ECHR, without actually
enabling the specific guarantees of the convention. J. FAWCETr, supra note 25, at 20.
106. Although the literal language of articles 5(5) and 13 suggest that domestic effect be accorded the ECHR, this has not been the practice under the ECHR. P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF,
supra note 49, at 4-5; see also F. CASTBERG, supra note 104, at 13-14.
107. See P. VAN DUK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 10-13.
108. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 8, at 230. One should note that the protection of privacy in the
home is somewhat limited, given the scope of article 8(2) exceptions. See P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN
HOOF, supra note 49, at 294-95. The exceptions clause has less effect on the protection of correspondence and family life. Id. Governmental concerns, such as the prevention of crime and national
defense, may justify an invasion of one's privacy in the home do not arise as often in the context of
correspondence or family relations. Finally, one should note that article 8 does not protect all aspects of privacy-nondisclosure of information and protection of likeness, for example, are protected
under article 10. Id. at 283.
109. Article 8 was derived in part from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
recognizes a right of privacy. The relevant provision of the Universal Declaration provides that:
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks." G.A. Res. 217A (I1), 9 U.N. GAOR at 71 art. 12,
U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948); see also J. FAWCETr, supra note 25, at 211. Although article 8 reaches
governmental infringements of privacy, it is an open question as to whether it creates government
liability for private invasions of privacy that are not compensated under existing domestic law. A
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family rights (including a right of parental access),'1 1 abortion and other
reproductive rights, 112 and certain freedoms from the disclosure of information. 11 3 Many of the cases arising under article 8 have been brought
against Britain, 114 and all of these involved official government actions
that were sanctioned by domestic statute or common law, but that arguably were inconsistent with Britain's article 8 obligations.
In applying the substantive provisions of article 8(1), the European
Court allows the signatory state to justify facially inconsistent statutes or
common law, if possible, under article 8(2).115 The article 8(2) exceptions clause allows the state to interfere with privacy rights under three
conditions: the interference must be prescribed by law;'1 6 the law must
be sufficiently clear so that a citizen can observe its dictates;11 7 and finally, the law must be "necessary in a democratic society."' 18 The court
small extension of existing precedents on article 8 would allow a holding that the article reaches
essentially private invasions of privacy. One need only assert that article 8 creates not only negative
prescriptions on government action, but positive duties to secure privacy rights against unofficial
incursion. See J. MERRILLS, supra note 99, at 95-96. Under the doctrine of Drittwirkung, a government may be liable for private actions violative of the ECHR, when such actions are tolerated under
domestic law and thus at least tacitly consented to by the signatory government. See P. VAN DIK &
G. VAN HooF, supra note 49, at 284-85. The theory of Drittwirkunghas not been expressly rejected
in the context of article 8. For a general discussion of the theory underlying the doctrine of
Drittwirkung, see id at 13-18. However, the European Court views article 8 principally as a protection against government invasions of privacy. Id. at 284.
110. See J. FAWCETr, supra note 25, at 226-28.
111. See id. at 216-26.
112. See P. VAN DIK & G. VAN HOOF,supra note 49, at 287. But cf J.FAWCETT, supra note
25, at 214 ("Article 8(l) cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as
a principle, solely a matter of the private life of the mother.").
113. See P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF, supra note 49, at 283.
114. See L. PErrri, THE EUROPEAN MACHINERY ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 (1987). A rationale for this phenomena may be the lack of domestic consideration of privacy claims. See Boyle and
Rice v. United Kingdom, 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 425 (1988); R. v. United Kingdom, 10 Eur. Hum.
Rts. Rep. 74 (1987); Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 347 (1983); Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 149 (1981).
115. Some would argue that the article 8(2) exceptions clause takes away most of what article
8(1) conveys, at least with respect to the protection of privacy in the home. See J.FAWCETr, supra
note 25, at 226-27. See also Kass v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1979-801 2 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep.
214, 231-37 (1978) (the European Court approved a German law allowing wiretaps; after examining
the language of article 8, the purpose of the law, and the oversights provided by the law, the European Court concluded that Germany had a legitimate purpose consistent with article 8(2) and that
the means used to effect that purpose were consistent with article 8).
116. See Malone v. United Kingdom, [1985] 7 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 14, 39-42 (1984).
117. See Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 347, 371-73, 376-77 (1983). Specifically, a law must be "accessible" and the potential sanctions for the law's breach must be "foreseeable." See Gillow v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 335, 350 (1989); Sunday Times v.
United Kingdom, [1979-80] 2 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 245, 271 (1979).
118. Silver, 5 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. at 376. The test is not whether a given law or practice is
desirable or administratively convenient, but whether it is required in order to achieve legitimate
state purposes. See id. at 376-77. See also J. MERRILLS, supra note 99, at 144-49 (discussion of the
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tends to use the practices of the signatory states to determine whether a
given practice meets this last criteria.' 19 However, state practices cannot
override the express provisions of the ECHR. The Court narrows the
"margin of appreciation" granted to member states when regulated activity implicates core privacy rights. 120 Article 8 does not confer an absolute right of privacy. It does, however, provide substantial protection to
individual autonomy.
3. Article 8 in the Domestic Courts of Britain. The United Kingdom does not give domestic effect to the ECHR. 121 British constitutional
theory allows the use of international treaties only to interpret ambiguous parliamentary enactments and to clarify the common law. International treaties, including the ECHR, are not automatically incorporated
into domestic British law. Lord Denning provided a succinct restatement of the status of the ECHR in English law:
European Court's interpretation of the "necessary in a democratic society" language in a number of

contexts).
119. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 149, 167 (1981). The Rees
Case is also illustrative of this practice. Rees v. United Kingdom, [1987] 9 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 56,
65-68 (1986) (United Kingdom not obliged to follow examples of other signatory states relating to
recognition of new sex for transsexuals in public records). See also Tyrer v. United Kingdom, [197980] 2 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 1, 9-12 (1978) (the Court used the "commonly accepted standards" of the
member states of the Council of Europe to determine whether the birching policy of the Isle of Man
was a degrading punishment for purposes of article 3 of the ECHR).
120. J. MERRILLS, supra note 99, at 148. When regulated behavior is at the heart of a protected
right, the European Court will require a showing of strict necessity to justify the burden on the
individual's exercise of the right. As the interest becomes more tenuously connected with the essential functions of the right, the court is more tolerant of government interferences. This is done
through the "margin of appreciation" given the defendant state. The margin of appreciation is at its
greatest when questions of morals are implicated, because questions of morality are subjective and
contextual. Dudgeon, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. at 164 (1981); see also Sunday Times, [1979-80]
2 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. at 275-76 (1979) (morals are left to state, except when the result is inconsistent with the practices of other states or with the existence of the right in question); Handyside v.
United Kingdom, [1979-80] 1 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 737, 753-55 (1976) (discretion granted to states
in matters of morality, but European Court has final say as to whether restriction is "reconcilable
with [the] freedom[s]" secured to individuals under the ECHR). There is an exception to this gen.
eral rule:
However, not only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of the activities involved will affect the scope of the margin of appreciation. The present case [on
homosexual sodomy] concerns a most intimate aspect of private life. Accordingly, there
must exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of the public authorities can be legitimate for the purposes of article 8.
Dudgeon, [1982] 4 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. at 165. The conclusion is that public authorities are given
great discretion over questions of morality, except when the regulations impinge on an essential
protected interest under the ECHR. In determining whether an interest is at the core of a given
right, the nature of the right and the practice of the signatory states are considered. Tyrer v. United
Kingdom, [1979-80] 2 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 1, 10 (1978).
121. W. PRAr, supra note 23, at 87.
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The position, as I understand it, is that if there is any ambiguity in our
statutes or uncertainty in our law, then these courts can look to the
convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and uncertainty, seeking always to bring them into harmony with it. Furthermore, when
Parliament is enacting a statute or the Secretary of State is framing
rules, the courts will assume that they had regard to the provisions of
the convention and intended to make the enactment accord with the
convention, and will interpret them accordingly. But I would dispute
altogether that the convention is part of our law.122

Thus, the supremacy of Parliament has led to problems concerning the
incorporation of the ECHR in Britain-problems that arise because domestic law does not independently secure all ECHR rights. 123 At best,
privacy serves as a canon of statutory construction; 124 this canon is insufficient to meet the requirements of article 8.
One argument for the domestic incorporation of article 8 of the
ECHR is that the article represents a codification of customary international law. Customary international law, 125 through incorporation by
the practice of sovereign nations, is a part of the domestic law of England. If a treaty represents the codification of pre-existing norms of international behavior, or if a treaty later comes to represent the current
standard of customary international law, then rights under such a treaty
would be justiciable in domestic British courts. 126 Thus, article 8 of the
122. R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, exparte Bibi, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979, 986
(C.A.).
The rights established under treaties are nonjusticiable in the courts of England, unless the
treaty implicates the Crown's power of war and peace, or Parliament enables the language of the
treaty. See Higgins, supra note 94, at 134-35, 137. The lack of domestic effect is related to the
manner in which treaties are negotiated and ratified. See id. at 130. Traditionally, the Crown, and
not Parliament, negotiated, concluded, and ratified treaties. See iL at 124. In modern times, the
ratification of a treaty is principally an executive function, although treaties are "laid before" Parliament before being ratified. Id. Even today treaties are officially concluded on behalf of the "Crown"
by the Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. See id. at 123. Since the Government
exercises broad control over the legislative pronouncements of the House of Commons, it makes
little sense to refuse to recognize the treaty domestically. The absence of any separation of powers in
Britain makes formalism in the incorporation of treaties into domestic law redundant at best. See
generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supranote 20, at 299-306 (describing Prime Minister's control
over the House of Commons' legislative schedule).
123. Higgins, supra note 94, at 129; Ryan, supra note 56, at 8, col. 1.
124. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
125. A succinct definition of the sources of international law may be found in article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signing June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
993, 3 Bevans 1179. However, no list of the sources of international law can be exhaustive. The
content of customary international law is constantly evolving based on present state practice. See
McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the InternationalLaw of the Sea, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 356,
357-58 (1955).
126. See Higgins, supra note 94, at 125; see also Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.).
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ECHR, if a codification of customary international law, would be incorporated into English law.

There are two competing doctrines concerning the incorporation of
international law into domestic British law: the incorporation theory
and the transformation theory. The incorporation theory holds that as
international law changes, British law changes with it, even if cases exist
that apply the old rule.12 7 This theory reflects a monist account of law-

there is only one law that operates on all persons.128
The transformation theory holds that changes in international law
must be incorporated either by parliamentary action or by the House of

Lords. Under the transformation approach, Britain does not automatically adopt changes in customary international law. This theory reflects
a dualist theory of law-municipal law and international law are totally
separate systems. International law applies only to states, and thus can-

not alter domestic law.129 Under this theory, only if the domestic government ratifies article 8 of the ECHR will it apply internally relating to

private persons.
In Trendex Trading Corp. v. CentralBank of Nigeria, the Court of
Appeal adopted the incorporation theory.1 30 Two judges opined that

changes in international law were directly assimilated into British law,
even if such changes conflicted with earlier cases decided by the Court of

Appeal or House of Lords.1 31 Lord Denning reasoned that because international law embodies no doctrine of case precedent, and because

English law requires the domestic courts to apply international law, domestic law must reflect changes in international law, even if these
changes are inconsistent with earlier domestic precedents.132
Given the incorporation theory of international law, it is theoretically possible that the ECHR (and article 8) could be incorporated into
127. Trendtex, [1977] I Q.B. at 553; see also Collier, Is InternationalLaw Really Part ofthe Law
ofEngland?, 38 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 924, 931-34 (1989) (discussing adoption of incorporation theory in the 1970s); Duffy, English Law & The European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INrr'L &
CoMp. L.Q. 585, 599-601 (1980) (discussing Trendtex and the incorporation approach).
128. For an excellent discussion on the currency of monist and dualist theories of law and the
incorporation of international law in England, see Collier, supra note 127, at 924-26.
129. See id at 925-26, 928-30.
130. [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.). In adopting this theory, it largely ignored an earlier case, R. v.
Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department, exparte Thakrar, [1974] 1 Q.B. 684, 701, which seemed
to adopt the transformation theory: "As between these two schools of thought [incorporation and
transformation], I now believe the doctrine of incorporation is correct." Trendtex, [1977] 1 Q.B. at
554.
131. Trendtex, [1977] 1 Q.B. at 554, 577 (Lord Denning and Shaw L.J. agreed that the incorporation theory was correct and that old cases interpreting international law could be overridden by
subsequent developments in international law).
132. Id. at 554; Collier, supra note 127, at 932.

Vol. 1990:1398]

BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRIVACY LAW

1423

English law without parliamentary action by arguing that the ECHR reflects customary principles of international law. However, the requirements necessary for success in this endeavor are difficult to satisfy. 133 A

plaintiff must show that respect for privacy has achieved strict observation in the practice of nation states. 34 .Although some obligations-such
as the prohibition on torture-create binding norms of behavior on
states,1 35 privacy has not yet reached this level of recognition and the

domestic courts have not found the argument that the ECHR (either in
1 36
whole or in part) embodies customary international law persuasive.

A more successful argument for the recognition of article 8 by the
British domestic courts is the principle of legitimate expectation. 37 The
principle derives from an administrative law concept similar to the right

to be heard under the due process clause of the United States Constitu38 Letion and the private contract law notion of promissory estoppel)
gitimate expectation covers rights not necessarily recognized at law, but
rights that have a reasonable basis in the law.' 39 Thus, there is no legal
right to the vindication of the interest, but rather a willingness by courts
to allow the vindication of reasonable expectations when those expectations are not inconsistent with statutory law. 40

133. On the difficulties in proving that the ECHR reflects customary international law, see
Duffy, supra note 127, at 599-605 (discussing the incorporation of international law into British law
and the requirements that must be satisfied before the ECHR is considered "customary international
law").
134. The problem is that, "despite the international (and national) instruments, instances of
human rights violations are all too frequent, thus weakening the argument based on state practice
stricto sensu." Id. at 602.
135. Id. at 604-05.
136. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
137. See Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1969] 2 Ch. 149, 170 (C.A.); AttorneyGeneral of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 A.C. 629, 636 (P.C.). For a more recent discussion of these cases and of the principle of legitimate expectations, see Chundawadra v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal, 1988 Imm. A.R. 161, 169, 170.
138. For a discussion of "legitimate expectation" paralleling United States' notions of due process, see Salemi v. MacKellar (No. 2), [1977] 137 C.L.R. 396, 404-05, 422-23 (Austl.). Although,
this is an Australian case, the British Court of Appeal cited the case in Chundawadra.
Chundawadra, 1988 Imm. A.R. at 170. For the American formulation of the due process notion, see
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it [the benefit]. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.") See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). The analogy to promissory estoppel is helpful by way of loose analogy. Promissory estoppel operates primarily in the private sector rather than
the public sector. At bottom, "legitimate expectation" is a doctrine of British administrative law
meant to secure the reliance interests of those whose activities the government regulates in one way
or another.
139. See Chundawadra, 1988 Imm. A.R. at 170 (quoting Ng Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 App. Cas. at

636 (P.C.)).
140. See id. at 173. The doctrine is discretionary in its application. See id. at 170 (quoting Ng
Yuen Shiu, [1983] 2 App. Cas. at 636 (P.C.)).
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A legitimate expectation may arise from the actions or statements of
a public authority. 14 1 In recent years, litigants have argued that based on

current government policy, they have a "legitimate expectation" 1 42 of domestic protection of their article 8 rights. The results have been largely

disappointing.
Chundawadra v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal1 43 illustrates the argument that the principle of legitimate expectation sometimes requires

the explicit incorporation of article 8 into domestic law. Chundawadra
presented the novel argument that he had a "legitimate expectation" that
the Home Secretary144would take article 8 into account in assessing his
immigration status.
The immigration statutes in question included a
requirement that the person deciding the case consider the "public
good,"1 45 and Chundawadra argued that the "public good" included
Britain's compliance with its international obligations.

After laboriously examining the present scope and history of legitimate expectation, the Court of Appeal unflinchingly rejected its applica-

tion to rights arising under article 8 on the facts presented.1 46 The court
concluded that because Parliament had not incorporated article 8 into

British domestic law, an individual could not maintain a legitimate expectation that public authorities considered article 8.
Not all the Lords were so quick to reject the legitimate expectation

argument. Lord Slade's concurrence would have reserved the determination of the outcome if the Secretary of State had a clearly established
policy of considering the ECHR in exercising his discretionary statutory
authority.14 7 He believed that it was possible for a legitimate expectation
to arise when a governmental agency, exercising discretionary decision141. Id. at 171 (quoting Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., [1985] 1
App. Cas. 374, 401 (H.L.)).
142. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
143. [1988] Imm. A.R. 161.
144. Id. at 169.
145. Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 3(5)(b).
146. The Court stated the following:
Here there is an international treaty; the Government of the United Kingdom has acceded
to it but it is not embodied in our domestic legislation, and indeed, whether it should be is
the subject of a good deal of discussion. But it is not and because it is not it may not be
looked at or prayed in aid in relation to matters in these courts save when a question of
ambiguity in a statute or other legal text arises. That not being the case here, it may not be
looked at all and no expectation that it should be followed can arise.... it is not appropriate to introduce the Convention into the law of England by the back door of legitimate
expectation when the front door is firmly barred.
Chundawadra,[1988] Imm. A.R. at 174.
147. Id. at 175. See, eg., Somasundarum v. Entry Clearance Officer Colomobo, [1990] Imm.
A.R. 16, 20 ("[Where criteria in immigration issues are clearly set out in English law, there is no
power to refer to the Convention on Human Rights or any other Convention. However there may
be consideration of Conventions in the exercise of an executive discretion.").
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making power, had an established policy of considering article 8 in the
decisionmaking process.

Although Lord Slade's observation appears promising, it does not
significantly alter the status of the ECHR in British domestic courts: absent parliamentary reference to article 8, the article and privacy are only
considered by the courts when they construe ambiguous statutes. 148 The
courts have held that a government minister is not required to consider
the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom when exercising discretionary authority. 149 Yet a decisionmaker could adopt a unilateral policy

requiring the consideration of article 8-or any other provision of the
ECHR. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of legitimate expecta-

tion would allow the consideration of article 8 by the domestic courts. 150
Legitimate expectation demonstrates one way to incorporate article 8.

However, the incorporation of article 8 in this manner not only will be
piecemeal, but also will be subject to parliamentary reversal by statute.
4. The Interactionof the European Court and the British Domestic
Courts: Attempts to Vindicate Article 8 Rights. Because of the difficul-

ties encountered in vindicating article 8 rights in the domestic courts of
Britain, some British citizens have sought relief in the European Court of
Human Rights by arguing a breach of the right of privacy protected by

article 8. As a consequence, the European Court, domestic British
courts, and Parliament have worked together to bring British law into
compliance with article 8. Custody and correspondence matters present
two types of cases that demonstrate not only that Britain is not fulfilling

its obligations under article 8, but also that the European Court can be a
148. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
149. R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow exparte Bibi, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 976, 984 (C.A.).
150. A 1987 case authored by Judge Taylor lends support to the limited usefulness of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of privacy. I v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't
ex parte Ruddock, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1482 (Q.B.) held that when a warrant for a telephone wiretap
was issued, those subject to it could claim a legitimate expectation that the declared policies of the
Home Secretary would be followed, unless a public change of such policies was announced. A member of a nuclear disarmament campaign who had her phone tapped claimed that the procedures
followed to authorize the tap violated the Home Department's publicly adopted guidelines. Id. at
1484-88, 1493. While invoking article 8 and Malone v. United Kingdom, [1985] 7 Eur. Hum. Rts.
Rep. 14 (1984) as background considerations, Ruddock's barrister founded his argument on the
doctrine of legitimate expectation. Id. at 1493-97.
It was argued that the privacy interest under article 8 showed an injury sufficient to predicate
the invocation of the legitimate expectation doctrine. Id. at 1493-94. Ruddock accepts in large part
the approach suggested by Lord Slade in Chundawadra. See Chundawadra, 1988 Imm. A.R. at 17576. The trend is to allow the indirect vindication of privacy interests through legitimate expectation
when the facts will evidence the breach of an affirmative promise or policy by a government agency
or officer. Id at 1497.
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necessary alternate forum for British citizens to pursue their autonomy
claims.
Although British citizens may pursue their claims in the European
Court, from a national perspective, this is hardly an ideal forum. The
process allows a foreign tribunal to scrutinize the act of the British Parliament for violations of basic human rights.151 British cultural values
may be unduly discounted by allowing a foreign tribunal to judge the
correct line between individual right and community prerogative in Britain. However, if the British government will not police itself, the European Court is authorized to assume this responsibility.
In response to European Court decisions, Parliament has reacted
positively in some instances by bringing British law into compliance
with article 8. Although courts are willing to enforce privacy claims
when authorized by Parliament, the courts will not independently apply
article 8. The social costs engendered by this system are high.
a. An example of the British legal system and the European Court
interacting: custody cases and article & In cases involving parental
rights, the ECHR and article 8 have been used to defend against government actions. These cases arise under the protection of privacy in the
family life contained in article 8(1). Problems occur because of the inherent conflict between parental rights and the state's interest in protecting
children from unfit or abusive parents.
In R. v. United Kingdom, 152 the European Court found that the discretion given to British local authorities to decide custody matters, coupled with the lack of effective judicial review, constituted a violation of
article 8.153 Because the hearings in question set in motion a process that
could result in the total severance of all parental rights, the European
Court found that article 8 required meaningful participation by custodial
parents informed of the possible consequences of the local authority's
action. The court also held that the local authority's decisions must be
subject to timely judicial review.1 54 Although article 8(2) authorized in151. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 269-71, 298-99.
152. [1988] 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 74 (1987).
153. Id. at 46, 48-50 (the facts and legal analysis for R. v. United Kingdom are in part reported

in W. v. United Kingdom, [1988] 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 29 (1987); an explanatory note appears at
10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 76.).
154. Id. at 49-51, 80. A related, but different, interest was at issue in Gaskin v. United Kingdom,
[1990] 12 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 36, 38-43 (1989). Gaskin involved a request for documents related to
Gaskin's childhood. Mr. Gaskin, as a child, had been in the custody of various social services departments following the death of his mother. Id. at 38. The Liverpool City Council refused to
provide Mr. Gaskin with access to his files, which included statements provided on a confidential

basis. Id. at 39. The European Court of Human Rights held that the City Council violated article 8
by refusing to provide Mr. Gaskin with his personal records. The Court concluded that personal
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terference with parental rights of access, the court held that the right to
be heard and participate in such hearings was essential to meeting the
"necessity" prong of the article 8(2) exceptions clause. 15 5 Thus, the case
was as much about procedural fairness as it was about parental rights.
In the wake of R. v. United Kingdom, Parliament reformed its custody laws to bring British law into compliance with article 8.156 However, the courts remained unwilling to consider independently article 8.
Despite the existence of clear precedents from the European Court, the
British judiciary continues to apply unambiguous parliamentary enactments without regard to privacy interests; however, if Parliament itself
takes article 8 into consideration when passing a statute, the courts will
directly address the privacy claims.

A recent case, In re K.D.,157 illustrates the judiciary's willingness to
address privacy claims when authorized to do so by Parliament. The
case presented the issue of whether a clearly unfit mother could continue
to exercise parental rights. The court denied the teenage mother access
to her children until she severed contact between her boyfriend and the
children. 158 In approaching this problem, the Law Lords often referred
to the principles embodied in article 8 in an attempt to resolve the con-

flict between English law and the requirements of the ECHR. 159

The reason the Lords considered article 8 was, in part, due to R. v.
United Kingdom---the custody case in which Britain was found to have
violated article 8.160 The mother's barristers presented legislative history
to the House of Lords that indicated parliamentary concerns similar to, if
files regarding "family life" that are maintained by the government could not be arbitrarily kept
confidential. Id. at 50. Gaskin is one more example of the British government's failure to properly
implement article 8, illustrating again the need for the domestic incorporation of article 8.
155. Id. at 50-53. See supra text accompanying note 108 for the text of the article 8(2) exceptions clause. R. v. United Kingdom was one of several cases contemporaneously decided by the
European Court of Human Rights reviewing Britain's custody laws. [1988] 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep.
1-122 (1987).
156. M. v. H., [1990] 1 App. Cas. 686, 722 (H.L.).
157. [1988] 1 App. Cas. 806 (H.L.).
158. Id. at 813-15 (speech of Lord Oliver, setting out facts of case).
159. "In my opinion there is no inconsistency of principle or application between the English
rule and the Convention rule. The best person to bring up a child is the natural parent." Id. at 812.
Lord Oliver seems to apply English law, but also considers the requirements imposed under article 8.
For example, Lord Oliver stated that:
Although this [the R. v. United Kingdom case from the European Court] is not binding
upon your Lordships, the United Kingdom is, of course, a party to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and it is urged that it is at least
desirable that the domestic law of the United Kingdom should accord with the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights under the Convention.
Id. at 823. Lord Oliver then proceeds to square domestic law with Britain's article 8 obligations. Id.
at 823-25.
160. In response to R. v. United Kingdom, Parliament modified British law to reflect the European Court's decision. See infra note 163; [1988] 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 74 (1987).
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not coextensive with, rights guaranteed under article 8. Although the
Lords found that the procedures used in the custody hearing complied
with both English law and the duties imposed by article 8,161 reference
to article 8 is, in itself, surprising. The House of Lords felt it necessary to
address article 8 directly, even though it could not bind the Lords.
The congruence of article 8 and domestic law on the delineation of
parental rights legitimated judicial reference to the article. Because British statutory and common law characterized parental access as a fundamental interest, the Law Lords were not preempting parliamentary
decisionmaking by independently giving effect to a legal provision of the
ECHR. 162 Thus, the ECHR may be relevant in modifying or applying
domestic law-especially if the article 8 right in question is squarely addressed under statutory law.
Although some privacy rights are vindicated by the domestic British
courts, R. v. United Kingdom is emblematic of the social cost created by
the British system.1 63 The system forced the parent to go through time
consuming (and largely useless) appeals in the domestic courts before
permitting recourse to the European Court. The British judiciary views
this as a necessary evil. Judicial deference preserves the necessity of par161. Id. at 828-30.
162. In Re K.D., [1988] 1 App. Cas. at 811-13, 823-25.
163. Id. M. v. H. demonstrates the Lords' limited use of article 8 as a tool in statutory interpretation. In M. v. H., a biological father demanded rights of parental access to a child born outside of
wedlock. British custody law did not recognize a right of access for unmarried biological parents,
whereas case law from the European Court suggested that article 8 required some legal process
before such a denial of parental access could be permitted. Id. at 713-18. Under the terms of the
custody statute, the British domestic courts could not review the merits of local custody officials'
decisions. Id at 718-21. Counsel for the father suggested that the previous British cases were
wrongly decided, especially in light of recent decisions of the European Court interpreting article 8.
Id. at 717-18.
The House of Lords, per Lord Brandon, squarely rejected the application of article 8. They
held that article 8 cannot be applied if the result would be inconsistent with domestic statutory and
case law. Id. at 721. The bench recognized that their decision was inconsistent with Britain's international obligations under the ECHR. Nevertheless, the Lords refused to modify domestic law to
accommodate the requirements imposed under article 8: "Parliament has not, in the statutes relating to children in the care of local authorities . . . given full effect to certain provisions of the
Convention, and has in that respect failed fully to comply with the international obligations of the
United Kingdom as a party to it." Id. at 721-22. Lord Brandon's speech concluded by observing
that Parliament amended British domestic law in anticipation of the R. v. United Kingdom decision
by the European Court and that Parliament may do so again to avoid the possibility of being sanctioned in the event that the father took his case to the European Court. Id. at 722.
The gravamen of In Re K.D., [1988] 1 App. Cas. 806 (H.L.), is thus limited: Where domestic
law is not clearly consistent with the ECHR, the House of Lords defers to Parliament to make
whatever changes they deem necessary. While the efficiency of Parliament in addressing such
problems when they arise makes this a workable system, one cannot help but question the fairness of
this approach to individual litigants. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at
299-306 (describing the efficiency of parliamentary law reform).
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liamentary reforms and creates an impetus for parliamentary action. 164
If legislative reform is more thorough and more effective than piecemeal
judicial reform, then there is nothing problematic with this approach. 165
However, this argument presupposes that Parliament will vindicate minority autonomy interests. This premise is open to question: Why
should a democratic, majoritarian body respond to the autonomy demands of distinct insular minorities? The question of Parliamentary sensitivity to unrepresented groups remains unanswered.
In Re K.D. and R. v. United Kingdom do not incorporate the ECHR
as a whole. Only if a right already exists under domestic law may provisions of the ECHR and the case law interpreting it be considered by a
British court applying domestic law. This mode of interpretation gives
some provisions of the ECHR the status of a principle of constructionas tools of statutory interpretation. The Law Lords will harmonize domestic law and obligations under the ECHR, but they will not allow the
ECHR to preempt conflicting domestic legal norms.
b. An example of article 8 precipitatingunilateralreform: the correspondence cases. Like parental rights, the ability of individuals to
communicate with each other without government surveillance is an important aspect of privacy that is necessary for a free society. British domestic courts also have refused to vindicate article 8 rights to privacy for
personal correspondence absent express or implicit parliamentary authorization. However, the interaction between the European Court and
the British legal system that occurred (and is still ongoing) in the custody
cases is absent in the correspondence cases.
In Boyle and Rice v. United Kingdom, 16 6 the European Court held
that the United Kingdom's practice of opening prisoners' mail addressed
to their legal representatives constituted a breach of article 8.167 The
British government reformed its policies before the decision was handed
down, more or less admitting that its prior practice was not in compliance with article 8. Thus, the European Court and article 8 can precipitate the complete reform of a given area of the law.
164. See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text.
165. Some say this is especially true in the United Kingdom, where for 400 years the system's
reliance on parliamentary reform has arguably worked quite well. Interview with P.S. Atiyah in
Durham, N.C. (March 22, 1989). But cf Rule, Group Says Press Freedom is Decliningin Britain,

N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1990, § A, at 7, col. 1 ("The U.K. with no written constitution and no formal
protection of freedom of expression has depended on a tradition of self-restraint by the law-making
and law-enforcement authorities. The worrying trend toward tighter governmental control shows
that these traditional safeguards are no longer working and, therefore, no longer adequate [quoting
Dr. Frances D'Souza, director of Article 19, a London-based human rights group].").
166. 10 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 425 (1988).
167. Id. at 441-42.
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c. Parliamentaryreaction to cases from the European Court is a
poor means of securingcompliance with article8. The cases presented in
this subsection illustrate the effect that the ECHR can have on British
domestic law. Without pressure from the European Court, modification
of the custody laws and prison rules might never have occurred.
Although the domestic courts can cite inconsistencies with domestic law
and the ECHR, they will not ascribe any legal consequences to this conflict absent a parliamentary command. Parliamentary action inevitably
follows decisions from the European Court: But why should reform wait
on a decision from the Strasbourg court? A review of the article 8 claims
on the merits by the British domestic courts prior to review by the European Court makes sense. The British domestic courts are in the best
position to interpret their own laws, provided the laws are consistent
with article 8. Additionally, the financial expense and embarrassment of
defending a suit before the European Court could be avoided if most
claims were decided on the merits in the domestic courts. The present
system works, insofar as it brings about reform, but it fails to the extent
that it discourages the aggressive litigation of human and political rights.
D.

The Future of a Right of Privacy in Britain

1. The EuropeanEconomic Community Adoption of Article 8 in the
Commercial Context. Article 8's future as a source of domestic privacy
rights is not yet completely determined. Just as the Treaty of Rome
(which established the EEC) assumed greater significance with the passage of time, so too could the ECHR. Consider Lord Denning's prophetic observation about the role of the Treaty of Rome in the early
1970s: "[W]hen we come to matters with a European element, the
Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back ....-168 Very few people could have
foreseen the complete commercial integration of Europe, which is almost
a reality. Likewise, although the ECHR, a charter of basic human rights,
does not yet have the ubiquitous presence of the Treaty of Rome, the day
when the ECHR directly displaces domestic laws may one day arrive.
Although it is far from a certainty, the ECHR and the institutions implementing it may also become a source of British domestic law in the same
way as the Treaty of Rome.
A more limited implementation of the principles of the ECHR may
already have arrived. The European Economic Community's Court of
Justice uses the principles reflected in the ECHR, and article 8 in partic168. H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger, S.A., [1974] 1 Ch. 401, 418 (C.A.). The supranational
character of the EEC has certainly accelerated this process. See supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
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ular, as a source of guidelines for permissible community action. 169 Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law that
17 0
the Court of Justice protects.
Thus, privacy interests are "fundamental rights" recognized and
protected in commercial affairs by the EEC. The indirect importation of
article 8 in the commercial context by the EEC presents a plausible stimulus to further parliamentary action. As the commercial integration of
Europe continues, the ECHR may take on greater significance in the
United Kingdom through EEC law (but only in the commercial context).
Eventually, a dichotomy in the domestic rights of individuals may develop between their commercial lives-as governed by EEC law-and
their private lives, as governed by British domestic law. Individuals conceivably could enjoy greater protection in the board room than in the
bedroom. At that point, Parliament would have to consider the wisdom
of continuing to refuse to incorporate the ECHR into domestic law.
2. A FinalComment on Privacy in Great Britain Great Britain's
interniational obligation under the ECHR to vindicate certain privacy interests cannot be dismissed or ignored. Some legally cognizable privacy
right-particularly as against the government-is necessary for Great
Britain to fulfill its obligations under the ECHR and the Universal Dec169. See National Panasonic Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1980 E. Comn.
Ct. J. Rep. 2033, 2056-58, [1980] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 169, 186-87. The formal adoption of the
ECHR standards by the EEC would go far toward securing to British citizens in domestic courts.
See also P. VAN DUK & G. vAN Hoop, supra note 49, at 479-486 (discussing the interplay between
the EEC and the ECHR, and the potential for greater application of the principles of the ECHR by
the EEC).
170. P. VAN DUK & G. VAN Hoop, supra note 49, at 13. It is relatively well established that the
ECHR is a source of fundamental principles which are part of Community law: "Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights, on which the Member States have collaborated or
of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework
of Community law." Nold, Kohien, and Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 507, [1974] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 338, 354.
Where a nexus exists between an area ceded to the Community's institutions under the Treaty
of Rome and a protected "fundamental right" guaranteed by the ECHR, the Community will adjudicate the individual's claim using standards derived from the guarantees of the ECHR. In practical
terms, this would suggest that the preemption of domestic law by the EEC would then lead to the de
facto domestic application of the rights protected under ECHR as part of Community law, even in
the United Kingdom. Community law supersedes inconsistent domestic law, and therefore could
create a domestic claim to a privacy right similar to article 8. For an example of EEC law superseding domestic law (in Scotland), see Kaur v. Lord Advocate, 1980 Sess. Cas. 319, 336. For a discussion of the implications of the ECHR as a norm of EEC law, see P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HOOF,
supra note 49, at 479-86.
With regard to article 8 in particular, see the statement of the Advocate-General of the Court of
Justice in State v. Watson, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1205, [1976] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 552,
564. Article 8 was relevant in deciding whether an Italian immigration policy violated article 48 of
the Treaty of Rome on the free movement of persons. Id. at 1192-93, 571-72.
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laration of Human Rights.1 71 Parliament's refusal to allow the domestic
courts to entertain arguments premised on article 8 ensures the breach of
this obligation. Apparently, securing the rights guaranteed under the
ECHR is a lower priority for Parliament than maintaining its traditional
prerogative of plenary legislative authority.
Perhaps Britain should continue to abjure individual justice in favor
of the greater good of reliable Parliamentary reform. 172 But from an
1 73
American perspective, this solution seems harsh-if not unjustifiable.
If a society truly believes in liberty, then it must support liberty for all.
The institutional framework of government must provide distinct subgroups with the opportunity to be heard. Further, if the majority elects
to vest rights (as Britain has in acceding to the ECHR), it should ensure
that claims to those rights are vindicated regardless of the status of the
person who makes the claim.
III.

PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES-THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCES

The transformation of privacy and autonomy concerns into constitutionally cognizable rights is a relatively new occurrence in the United
States. Over the last several decades, the courts have wrought a revolution in autonomy rights. The tension between individual claims to deference with regard to personal choices and community claims to regulate
behavior for the good of all provides the central theme in the historical
development of these rights. The competing traditions of liberty maximization and majoritarian democratic principle have shaped this
dialectic.
Unlike Britain, the United States has adopted "privacy" as a useful
legal construct. The right of privacy provides United States citizens both
a substantive right and a procedural mechanism with which to challenge
intrusive government regulations. However, the experience of the United
States demonstrates that mere recognition of the right of privacy is insufficient to vindicate important autonomy interests. Procedural regularity
and clarity in defining the privacy right are integral to its effective vindication by courts. The British system's approach to privacy, although seriously flawed, possesses both virtues: Privacy rights are clearly defined
and the legal process of enforcing those rights is strictly circumscribed.
However, certainty and procedural regularity should not outweigh the
171. See YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 212. The United Kingdom wins as often as it
loses when brought before the European Court; however, its overall record is at best spotty. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
173. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 229-39; id. at 420-26.
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ultimate goal of vindicating liberty. Britain's reticence to adopt a right of

privacy is based on the faulty assumption that a "right of privacy" cannot be predictably and uniformly applied by Courts.17 4 The history of
privacy law in the United States demonstrates that tradition could provide a solution to the problem of inclusive rights at the cost of certainty.
Tradition could effectively delimit the scope of privacy rights without
unduly limiting them.17 5 An examination of the American experience
with privacy law will amply demonstrate that the British concern for
legal certainty need not be sacrificed in order to more effectively protect
the liberties of the people.
The broad language of the Constitution ostensibly protects individual liberty from governmental encroachment. Concurrently, the Constitution contains a strong infusion of a democratic principle that implies
majoritarian choicemaking. Forced to disentangle these contradictory
constitutional norms, the Court has referred to community tradition as a
means of validating claims of autonomy.1 76 The use of tradition, however, risks a pernicious contamination of liberty by allowing majoritarian
impulses to regulate unpopular behavior. Even though United States'
privacy law utilizes a different institutional paradigm, it suffers from the
same malady of the British regime-too much concern for majoritarian
preferences, and not enough concern for the competing (majoritarian)

value of individual liberty.
In the United States, privacy rights primarily are vindicated by the
federal judiciary, rather than the Congress. Although the role of Congress in the development of privacy rights has been far less important
than Parliament's role in Britain, Congress has enacted some laws that
implicate "privacy" interests. In the 1960s and 1970s, technological advances in information collection and transmission greatly increased the
potential for government invasion of individual privacy rights. In response, Congress enacted laws that created rights and duties with respect
to the gathering, maintenance, and dissemination of information about
174. See Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] 1 Ch. 344, 372-73 (Ch.) (broadly
worded rights, such as the right of privacy, cannot be predictably applied by courts and therefore
should be avoided whenever possible).
175. Both the European Court, see supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text, and the EEC, see
supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text, use tradition to delimit broadly worded rights. Thus,
Britain's rejection of article 8 reflects, in part, a rejection of tradition as a meaningful delimiting
principle to cabin judicial decisions. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 423
(European Court, interpreting a text without standards, issues "mere opinions"). I suggest that
tradition can provide meaningful guidance to courts, thus meeting the British passion for legal predictability and conformity.
176. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) (Justice Scalia says that the
existence of laws prohibiting an act excludes that act from protection under the due process clause;
clause protects only "important traditional values").
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individuals; 17 7 however, these laws did not focus on individual autonomy. 178 The task of vindicating autonomy claims remained with the federal judiciary.
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to develop a distinct privacy
doctrine.179 The Court considered deference to individual choicemaking
a legitimate object for judicial protection. In the 1960s and 1970s, early
precedents from the 1920s were used to expand the right of privacy into a
shibboleth capable of overpowering state and federal laws. However, in
the 1980s, the Court reexamined its use of the right of privacy and its
earlier precedents.
Today privacy law in the United States is at a crossroads. The
Court ultimately must choose between older cases that emphasize individual rights (placing the burden on the state to justify regulation of individual behavior) and new decisions that emphasize the community's
interest in self-regulation through democratic institutions (placing the
burden of proof on the individual to affirmatively establish why the government cannot act as it has). Although the existence of the right of
privacy is not in immediate danger, the contemporary Court could severely restrict the scope of the right. The recent developments in United
States privacy law demonstrate that the recognition of a right of privacy
did not resolve all problems. How a "right" is implemented may be as
important as whether the right is recognized in the first place.
A.

The Development of the Right of Privacy in the United States

State legislatures or the federal Congress could have assumed primary responsibility for the development of U.S. privacy law. Instead, the
federal judiciary, insulated from the rigors of partisan politics, has as177. These include: The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966),
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), (codified at 5 U.S.C.

§

552 (1988)) (requires

government disclosure of information gathered and collected in certain matters); the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422
(1988)) (limits access to an individual's financial records kept by financial institutions); the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t
(1988)) (requires that consumer reporting agencies adopt procedures to ensure fairness and confiden-

tiality); the Family Education and Privilege Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (1988)) (describing conditions for inspection of educational records); and the Privacy

Act, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1883 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000aa-2000aal2) (1988))

(defining scope of government's access to certain private materials in conducting a criminal
investigation).
178. R. HIxsoN, supra note 18, at 219. These interests, while important, do not go to the heart
of what the author perceives as the right of privacy. Although they are cognizable under the aegis of
"privacy," they do not guarantee individual autonomy and choice in matters of fundamental
importance.
179. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,

534-35 (1925).
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sumed the task of protecting privacy rights from the directly elected
majoritarian governmental branches. Invoking the tradition of liberty
reflected in the Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court required that government justify its actions when challenged by
those adversely affected by state laws.
1. The Use of the Tradition of Liberty in Early Privacy Case Law.
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court used the liberty clause of the fourteenth
amendment to vindicate privacy interests as a legitimate expectation of
the citizenry. Meyer v. Nebraska 11o and Pierce v. Society of Sisters",'
established that parents have a privacy interest in raising their children.

Noting that the people of the United States believed that the education
and upbringing of children was largely the responsibility of parents, the
Court recognized and validated a community tradition of deference to
parents in the rearing of their children. 82 Thus, the Court looked to the
83
tradition of community deference to parents raising their children
rather than examining the traditional way in which children were
180. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Meyer involved a challenge to a state statute which prohibited
the teaching of foreign languages in private or parochial schools. Id. at 396-99. In finding the
statute in violation of the fourteenth amendment's protection of "liberty" interests, the Court recognized that due process included the right to make certain decisions of a personal nature. Id. The
Court expressed this interest as a distinct claim of the citizenry against their state governments:
"That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which
must be respected." Id at 401.
181. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Pierce struck down a state statute requiring all children to
attend public schools, as opposed to private or parochial schools. Id at 530-32. Oregon's interest in
ensuring the education of its children could not preclude the ability of parents, or families, to exercise choice with respect to the upbringing of children:
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.... The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
Id. at 535-36. Pierce, like Meyer, arises as a "liberty" interest case under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 533. The Court recognizes that "liberty" encompasses autonomy with respect to a given
matter not specifically enunciated in the text of the Constitution. Id. at 535. This analytic framework paved the way for Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that implied
rights exist within the broad language of the Constitution. See id at 484. Pierce and Meyer help
illustrate one of the quirks of U.S. privacy jurisprudence at the constitutional level: There is no
express guarantee of privacy in the document.
182. See Pierce, 286 U.S. at 534. The use of tradition and community values in delimiting privacy/liberty interests has been rediscovered by the modem Court. See, eg., Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) ("[P]roscriptions against such conduct [homosexual sodomy] have ancient
roots."); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (The sanctity of family is protected by the Constitution "precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.").
183. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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raised.' 84 Drawing upon traditions of liberty enshrined in American society through the Constitution, the Supreme Court determined that an
individual family's claim to be left alone trumped the state legislature's
85
determination that the parents were raising their children improperly.
Meyer and Pierce accurately drew a line between the vindication of individual autonomy and the regulation of behavior by the community for
the good of all.
2. Griswold." Privacy as a General Constitutional Right. Meyer
and Pierce established a principle that exploded into new prominence in
the 1960s. Building upon the intellectual foundation established by
Meyer and Pierce, the Court greatly expanded the scope of the right of
privacy. Toward this end, the Court characterized privacy as a penumbra created by express textual provisions of the Bill of Rights and the
fourteenth amendment. Alternatively, some members of the Court cast
the notion of privacy as a particular kind of liberty interest, implicitly, if
18 6
not explicitly, protected under the ninth or fourteenth amendment.
Griswold v. Connecticut, the landmark case of 1965, represented a
major expansion of the constitutional protection of privacy. The case
raised the question of whether a state could regulate the intimate details
87
of the marital relationship.'
Griswold involved a challenge to a ban by Connecticut on the use of
contraceptive devices and the dissemination of information or instruction
on the use of such devices."" 8 Even though the statute had not been
strictly enforced, 18 9 it still stood as an impediment to effective family
planning counseling and practice. Griswold, the Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and a physician, provided counseling and instruction to married couples on various means of
contraception. 90 The Court struck down the Connecticut statute, finding that it unduly interfered with the marital relationship. In deciding
Griswold, the Court looked beyond the literal language of the Constitu184. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
185. Meyer 262 U.S. at 402; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. Indeed, we know that insofar as the legislatures of Nebraska and Oregon had prohibited the parents' course of action, the relevant communities
did not approve of how the parents were going about their parental duties.
186. Justice Douglas clearly accepted privacy as a free standing interest under the Constitution.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-86 (1965) and his concurrence in Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). In contrast, some have argued that the Roe v.
Wade Court could not, and did not, rely on privacy as a general constitutional right. See Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolff A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 931-33 (1973).
187. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480-82.

188. Id. at 480.
189. Id. at 506 (White, J., concurring).

190. Id. at 480.
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tion's text to ensure that states did not arbitrarily infringe upon basic
autonomy interests. 19 1
Regardless of the precise source of the right of privacy, 192 Griswold
established that individuals could make claims of privilege against some
state regulations. In Griswold, the promise of Meyer and Pierce came to
fruition with a full-fledged constitutional privacy doctrine. Although the
right of privacy clearly does not always override state regulations, courts
1 93
began to listen to arguments based on claims of autonomy.
191. By utilizing the ninth amendment to predicate a principle of deference toward individual
autonomy, id. at 486-99, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion resurrected the amendment in modem Constitutional law: "Mhe Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that
fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an
intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive." Id. at 492. He noted that
"the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the
specific terms of the Bill of Rights. Id
192. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); H. POLLACK & A. SMrrIH,
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 21-25 (1978); C. PRrrcHETT, CON-

STrrrUnONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 1-15 (1984).
The Slaughter House Cases held that the "privileges and immunities" language of the fourteenth amendment did not constitute a new limitation on the state governments' freedom of action.
The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78. The opinion, reviewed in light of the intervening 116
years, is more than a little ironic. The liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment was found to do
what the textually more congenial "privileges and immunities" clause could not-incorporate the
rights and liberties of the Bill of Rights. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (only those
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights which "have been found to be implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.");
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99-101 (1908) (Court considers possibility that due process
clause might incorporate some of the Bill of Rights as against the states).
193. The Supreme Court continued to build upon the foundation enunciated in Griswold. Katz
v. United States, a fourth amendment case, protected the expectation of privacy in electronic communications. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). The case involved the tapping of public telephones by the
government in an interstate gambling investigation which led to criminal prosecutions. Katz was
seemingly a clean victory for advocates of a right of privacy under the fourth amendment. However,
Justice Stewart's majority opinion expressly declined to adopt a general right of privacy. "[Tihe
Fourth amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.'" Id. at 350.
This is not to say that the fourth amendment does not protect privacy interests. Rather, Justice
Stewart believed that the fourth amendment is not limited to privacy interests, nor is it a proxy for a
general right to privacy.
However, some members of the Court perceived Katz as going too far in the direction of establishing a fourth amendment right of privacy. In the words of Justice Black, "the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonablesearches and
seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy." Id. at 373. Given the tenor of Justice Stewart's
majority opinion, Justice Black's concern seems overstated. In Katz Justice Black reacted against
the increasing willingness displayed by the Court to recognize a general privacy right under the
Constitution, related to, but distinct from, the strict textual provisions of the document. See id. at
374.
Katz was just one of several cases expanding and clarifying the privacy interests protected by
individual amendments. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), used the first amendment to create
a near-absolute right to privacy in the home where free speech was implicated. In the wake of
Stanley, one has the right of privacy under the first amendment to peruse obscene materials in the
home, but the state may prescribe the means of obtaining such material commercially. Id. at 567.
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B. Autonomy Rights Are Correctly Vindicated Through the Modern
Right of Privacy
The development of the right of privacy in constitutional adjudication reflects the Court's frank recognition that the Constitution guarantees individuals protection from undue governmental regulation of
private life, despite the community's concern for its own security and
well-being. Yet the Court realized that some liberty interests are too destructive to the community's existence to be countenanced. Thus, in the
privacy cases, 194 the Court utilized the tradition of liberty in the United
States in order to limit the right of privacy and affirm the community's
right to regulate for the good of all its members.
In the abortion cases, 195 the Court applied the test of community
deference to individual liberty suggested by Meyer and Pierce. These
cases reflect a balancing of interests: the individual's right to make reproductive choices verses the community's interest in the protection of
potential life. However, the Court may be shifting away from Meyer,
Pierce, and Griswold. The most recent privacy cases reflect a disturbing
trend toward the vindication of majoritarian moral choices, rather than
the tradition of liberty set forth in Meyer and Pierce. In cases involving
sodomy and parental rights, the Court has utilized a new and potentially
dangerous test-the tradition of community approval of a particular
lifestyle. 196 This new test reflects an infusion of majoritarian choicemaking into what should be an analysis of the scope of individual autonomy.
1. The Abortion Decision's Test: Community Traditions of Autonomy in MoralDecisionmaking. Roe v. Wade, the controversial decision
that granted women a constitutional right to abortion, reaffirmed the
constitutional right of privacy established in Griswold.197 Roe also set
forth a balancing test to resolve conflicts between individual privacy and
legitimate state interests.1 98 The Court held that only a "compelling
The right of privacy enunciated in Stanley applies only in the home itself. In United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351 (1971), the Court held that Stanley did not extend to the right to use the mails to obtain
obscene materials. Id. at 355-56 ("To extrapolate from Stanley's right to have and peruse obscene

material in the privacy of his own home a First Amendment right in Reidel to sell it to him [Stanley]
would effectively scuttle Roth [v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] ....and we decline to do so
now.").

194. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

195. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. See infra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
197. 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
198. See id. at 154. The balancing test enunciated in Roe, and used in later abortion cases,
shows that even where fundamental rights are implicated, the state may prevail in delimiting behav-

Vol. 1990:1398]

BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRIVACY LAW

1439

state interest" could justify an invasion of the "right of privacy." 199
Although the Court referred to other constitutional amendments to support its holding,200 the majority secured the privacy interest from state
intervention primarily through the fourteenth amendment's liberty pro20 1
vision in connection with the ninth amendment privacy interest.
Thus, a majority of the Court finally accepted a specific formulation
of a general right of privacy. Roe completed the process that began in
the 1920s with Meyer and Pierce. The federal Constitution created limits
upon both the federal and state governments; governmental power was
cabined by the vesting of residual power in the individual citizens. According to the Court, invasive state regulations could not unduly burden
legitimate autonomy interests.
Roe's approach to privacy survives today. Although Webster v. Reproductive Health Services directly challenged the Roe decision, it did not
repudiate the privacy interest recognized in Roe.202 Webster involved a
Missouri law seemingly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Roe.203 Although the Supreme Court sustained several key portions of
the law, 2°4 the Court expressly declined to overrule Roe. 205 Therefore,
Webster leaves intact the fundamental interest/compelling state interest
balancing test for analyzing privacy claims, but recognizes a greater state
interest in the fetus than the Court accorded in Roe.
Abortion provides an example of the dilemma introduced by "undesirable" conduct that arguably falls within the domain of individual liberty. Abortion generally is not seen as a desirable experience, but rather
as an unfortunate event to be avoided. When a court inquires as to
whether the state should regulate abortion the outcome often hinges on
the manner in which the court poses the question. If the court asks,
"Does the community advocate abortion as a valuable activity?," it will
arrive at negative response. In contrast, if the Court asks whether the
ior if its "compelling interest" is sufficiently weighty. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3054-57 (1989). Privacy is not the enunciation of an absolute interest, but rather of
a cognizable interest which must be considered before the state intrudes into individual autonomy.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), makes plain that some interests potentially protected
under the right of privacy fall prey to state intrusion.
199. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
200. See id. at 152 (referring to the first, fourth and fifth amendments and the "penumbras of the
Bills of Rights").
201. Id. at 153.
202. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989) (court says existence of the abortion right not at issue and that
Roe is "undisturbed").
203. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3047-48.
204. Id at 3052-53. The Court upheld Missouri's decision not to commit any public funding to
abortion-whether through direct subsidy or indirectly through the use of state subsidized facilities
or services-by recognizing that the district court should not have passed on an issue that was moot.
205. Id at 3058.
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community approves of the state encroaching upon individual privacy by
limiting access to abortion, a different answer is both possible and likely.
If one acknowledges that the United States people-and their Constitution-adhere to a basic tradition of individual liberty, then the court
must choose the second formulation of the question. Of course, asking
the second question does not mean that an individual's privacy claim will
prevail-it merely requires the state to justify its intrusion into the individual's private life.
2. The Competing Test: Requiring Community Sanction for a
Given Activity. Contrary to the early trend to protect individual choice
in sexual and reproductive matters, 20 6 the court in Bowers v. Hardwick
held that the right of privacy under the liberty clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not protect individuals who wished to engage in private
homosexual sodomy. 20 7 The Court seemed to require that the activity in
question have community sanction before it would be accorded protection as a privacy interest. The Court noted that because "24 states and
the District of Columbia" had laws prohibiting sodomy, such conduct
could not meet the test of being "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition. '20 8 This test suggests that an individual must legitimate a
claim of privacy by demonstrating the community's acceptance of a particular behavior, rather than demonstrating the community's tolerance of
individual choice in the area. 2°9 When courts vindicate liberty interests,
neither the community nor the court necessarily sanctions a particular
behavior. Rather, decisions recognizing an individual's right of privacy
merely demonstrate the community's willingness to allow individuals to
make their own moral decisions.
A more recent case, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 2 10 further illustrates
this trend. In Michael H., a natural father established a relationship with
his adulterously conceived child. The biological mother and her husband
subsequently sought exclusive parental rights to the child 211-an outcome permitted by California law which conclusively presumed that children born to a married couple were the offspring of the couple.212 The
plurality opinion of the Court, written by Justice Scalia, found that
206.
panying
207.
208.
209.

Specifically, Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, Roe, and Webster. See supra notes 180-86 and accomtext.
478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
I.dat 193-94.
Interestingly, Justice Powell, in concurring with the opinion, noted that the Georgia law

had not been enforced "for several decades." Id. at 198 n.2. If this was so, one might ask whether
the community tradition was accurately reflected in the statute.
210. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
211. Id. at 113-17.
212. Id. at 117-19.
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Michael H. had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in his relationship with the child.2 13 Justice Scalia admonished that "[o]ur cases
reflect 'continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history
[and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' ",214
'21 5
He later noted that "our traditions have protected the marital family.
The Court, finding no accepted liberty interest, did not even engage in
the fundamental interest/compelling state interest balancing. Justice
Scalia explained: "In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the
[due process] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental'. . . but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society" 21 6 Justice Scalia argued that
tradition always has favored the nuclear marital family and that "adulterous fathers" have never had protected parental rights.
In footnote 6 of his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia opined that
"[w]e refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protect'21 7
ing, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.
This formulation of the question ensures that the community's moral
preferences, rather than a tradition of deference to individual decisionmaking, will control the adjudication of privacy claims. 21 8 From the
standpoint of the protection of privacy, a better way to use tradition in
Michael H. would have been to ask whether the community has recognized the interest of both the natural parent and the child in maintaining
a mutual relationship-regardless of whether the parental relationship is
coextensive with a marital relationship. This approach emphasizes liberty, but not at the expense of community values. 2 19 The difference between asking the individual liberty question and the Court's approach in
MichaelH. appears in the zone of protected autonomy that emerges from
the answer. In Michael H., the Court extended toleration only as far as
contemporary morals sanction a particular behavior. Such liberty is no

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

130.
122-23.
124 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)).
122.

217. Id. at 127-28 n.6.
218. A tradition of liberty can always be broken down into discrete acts, any number of which

the community may disapprove. The question then becomes whether broader traditions should always be ignored in favor of narrower traditions related to a discrete type of behavior.
219. I do not mean to suggest that the result in MichaelH. would be different under the alternative analysis I suggest. MichaelH. is a difficult case, even if one broadly applies community tradi-

tions of liberty.
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liberty-it is merely the freedom to conform. 220 Freedom entails the
right to make bad choices as well as good choices. 221
As the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on privacy,
Michael H. appears to represent a reshaping of the right. In particular,
footnote 6 of the plurality opinion seems to depart from earlier privacy
decisions.2 22 Justice Scalia's requirement that the most specific level of a
relevant tradition control the privacy analysis does not square with the
holdings of Meyer and Pierce. The most specific level at which a tradition could be identified in Meyer and Pierce would have been the particular type of instruction at issue. History is replete with examples of state
regulation of school curricula and mandatory attendance at accredited
institutions. 22 3 In Meyer and Pierce, the Court looked to a broader tradition-to the tradition of deference to parents in raising their children.
Thus Michael H. (and particularly footnote 6) represents a marked departure from the Court's earlier approach to privacy rights. 224 Indeed,
Michael H. attempts to complete the shift away from Meyer, Pierce, and
Griswold that began with Bowers.225
3. The Correct Use of Tradition Is Essential to VindicatingLegitimate Autonomy Interests. Bowers and Michael H. demonstrate the importance of asking the relevant question if the Court wishes to use
220. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (fourteenth amendment and the
nature of our society require toleration of "someone else's unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies").
221. The autonomy/individual choice approach to tradition in validating privacy claims would
not be a meaningless test. Some activities are seen as so destructive, and so damaging to the community's sense of well being as to not allow any room for individual autonomy-consensual human
sacrifice or the use of illicit drugs provide good examples.
222. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6 (1989).
223. More specifically, Nebraska, the setting for Meyer, had a community tradition of discouraging the teaching of German, while Oregon, where Pierce arose, had a tradition of requiring all minor
children to attend secular public schools.
224. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (refused to adopt the single mode of
historical analysis outlined in footnote 6, and noted its inconsistency with some Supreme Court
precedents protecting rights at levels of generality above the "most specific level" available).
225. See supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), the majority phrased the question as follows:
The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.
Id. at 190. Justice Blackmun would have none of it. Dissenting, he pointed out that:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," as
the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to
watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States was about a fundamental right to place
interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by Civilized men," namely, "the right to be let alone."
(citations omitted).
Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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community values as a touchstone for protecting liberty interests. Bowers asked whether the community historically approved of behavior "X."
A different question is whether the community traditionally has classed
"X" as a decision left to the individual. The Court in Meyer and Pierce

used this second question to develop a balancing test.
In the case of homosexual sodomy, Americans generally do not advocate either the act or the lifestyle of those who engage in it.226 But the
answer to the question of whether most Americans would want the state
to regulate sexual behavior in the bedrooms of America is far more am-

biguous. 227 The historic lack of enforcement of the sodomy statutes sug-

228
gests that the states have higher priorities than eliminating sodomy.
Yet the existence of laws criminalizing sodomy must in some way reflect
community sentiments. The community may believe that without an officially stated disapprobation of an undesirable behavior, the behavior
may become commonplace. 2 29 Hence, the statement of disapproval operates to create a tendency toward the community's idea of virtue. The
prohibition is not intended to coerce virtue: Some laws are meant to be
positive commands binding upon all, whereas some are mere precatory
statements of a community's moral norms.

226. The hesitance to repeal state sodomy laws, and the negative stereotypes of homosexuals in
the United States, suggest that the community does not approve of, much less advocate, sodomy.
See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 521, 523-28 (1986); R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 249-50 (1990).
227. For example, the New York Court of Appeals struck down New York's criminal sodomy
statute in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S. 947 (1980). The court
noted the privacy interest manifested as individual decision making:
At the outset it should be noted that the right addressed in the present context is not, as a
literal reading of the phrase might suggest, the right to maintain secrecy with respect to
one's affairs or personal behavior; rather, it is a right of independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct oneself in accordance
with those decisions, undeterred by governmental restraint-what we referred to... "as
freedom of conduct."
Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S. at 949. Interestingly, the Court made liberal reference to
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. Id at 485-88, 415 N.E.2d at 939-40, 434 N.Y.S. at 949-51. The
decision could be read as resting on tradition, to the extent that personal autonomy and liberty are
part of the American tradition. Id. at 485-91, 415 N.E.2d at 939-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d 949-53. The
Court also concludes that behavior that does not injure anyone else should be unregulated. Id at
490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
228. In Poe v. Ullman, the Supreme Court refused to reach the merits on a challenge to Connecticut's ban on the distribution, sale, or provision of birth control because the law had fallen into
desuetude. 367 U.S. 497, 507 (1961) ("During the more than three-quarters of a century since its
enactment, a prosecution for its violation seems never to have been initiated."). Poe illustrates how
the existence of a criminal statute does not establish that a community is resolved to prohibit a
particular act.
229. The maxim that "hypocrisy is the tribute life owes to virtue" is apropos.
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A law may or may not reflect community tradition regarding a particular matter. 230 Some legal thinkers suggest that legislative inaction
reflects the continuing approbation of the community in regulating private behavior.2 31 Yet, for a variety of reasons, such as a desire to avoid
the taint of any association with a controversial question, a legislature
may fail to repeal precatory laws even though this failure to act causes a
result that does not represent general community thought on a given
matter.2 32 Courts can and should look to the existence of laws prohibiting conduct in their attempt to divine tradition. However, even if a law
prohibiting a certain course of action exists, the courts must also look to
whether the history of the enforcement of the law confirms its use as the
dispositive source of the community's traditions.
Tradition can legitimize privacy claims--essentially claims of autonomy-against the community, even if the community disapproves of the
protected behavior. Because the right of privacy lacks a clear constitutional mandate, 233 the use of a tradition of individual liberty as a legitimating touchstone is a desirable, persuasive, and perhaps, necessary
approach. There is a danger, however, that the Court will ask the wrong
question when it seeks to delineate the contours of the American community's "tradition" on a given matter. 234 Thus, how the Court asks the
question prefigures the ultimate resolution.
230. For instance, many states prohibit all forms of gambling on sports events. Nevertheless,
small wagers on collegiate and professional athletics have been, and remain, a strongly enshrined
American tradition. USA Today does not publish odds on such events soley for the edification of
game theorists.
231. R. BORK, supra note 226, at 248-50, 352-53.
232. American legislatures are highly sensitive as to how their actions are perceived. Historically, they are not eager to take positions opposed by vocal minorities, even when the general population holds an opinion that is contrary to that of the minority group. See generally P. ATiYAH AND
R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 314 ("The passage of bills in a state legislature often says very little
about the 'will' of the legislature, and still less about the will of the electorate.").
233. Nowhere in the Constitution is "privacy" expressly mentioned. Professor John Hart Ely
clearly believed that Roe could not be justified on legal principles, since it lacked a firm constitutional touchstone: "At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution
marks for special protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an
obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking." Ely, supra note 186, at 936-37. Ely is not unsympathetic to the result in Roe, but believes that the Court lacked the competence to interfere with the
states' legislative pronouncements on this matter without providing a sounder foundation, Id. at
926-27, 931-33.
234. Another important consideration is what the relevant "community" should be for constitutional privacy analysis. The tenth amendment possibly suggests a state-by-state analysis of tradition
to determine whether the relevant state had a history of deference to choice on a given matter.
However, this would result in 51 different privacy precedents, each to be protected by the federal
judiciary, a clearly untenable position. But cf Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (Court
allows "contemporary community standards" to control obscenity trials; the Court apparently views
localities and/or states as permissible governmental units from which to define obscenity). Miller
involved the exclusion of materials from first amendment protection. However, in Reynolds v.
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A separate but related problem arises because of the changing nature of tradition. By definition, tradition is determined by reference to
the prior practices of the relevant community group. Conceivably, the
use of the tradition of liberty as an exclusive test might result in shifting
privacy rights that would: undermine the persuasiveness of precedent and
that would erode the legal force of court decisions. This problem is easily surmounted: Privacy rights should move in only one direction-toward greater levels of protection. Thus, over time, the court should
"ratchet up" the number of liberty interests recognized, but should not
"ratchet down" the sphere of protected personal autonomy, even if the
contemporary community's values are shifting. The application of the
ratchet approach requires a reviewing court to resolve two issues: is the
interest claimed one of the class already recognized, and if not, should it
be recognized as a legitimate autonomy claim. If the Court determines
that conduct falls within a tradition of community deference to individual liberty, then it will strike down attempts at reregulation, thus precluding a future change in tradition, absent constitutional amendment.
Alternatively, the Court should examine traditions of community deference as a primary test for validating yet unrecognized claims of privacy.
If such a tradition is not present-as is the case with illicit drugs-the
Court would then consider whether the behavior was so fundamentally
annexed to notions of "liberty" that it commands constitutional protection under the language of the fourteenth amendment. 235 In applying the
second step, the court should look to whether the states have traditionally regulated the conduct and also to whether such regulations have
been consistently enforced. The use of this two step process would resolve the problems inherent in the use of tradition as a constitutional test.
The court's renewed use of tradition as a means of determining privacy claims could be a welcome development. Since the first privacy
cases, American privacy law has lacked both procedural regularity and
substantive consistency. Tradition offers a rational means of cabining the
scope of the right; procedural regularity (predictable application of
clearly articulated tests) is a matter of self-discipline on the part of the
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Court refused to respect a local tradition in the Utah territory-bigamy. If Meyer and Pierce were correctly decided, the Court must look to a national-not
local-tradition in setting the minimal parameters of "liberty." The relevant "community" must be
national in scope, at least insofar as is needed to secure the minimal protection of liberty interests.
The notion of "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment logically cannot be a state-specific concept.
235. Essentially, this is the how the test works under current precedents. A citizen may attempt
to raise a privacy claim by showing that the interest has the imprimatur of "tradition," or by showing that the interest is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The former test is the approach
used in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977), and the latter one of Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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courts. The measure of liberty afforded United States citizens by the
right of privacy is and remains a function of both substance and process.
IV.

PRIVACY: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY V.
COMMUNITY SELF-REGULATION

The British judiciary refuses to recognize a general right of privacy,
either under domestic law or under article 8 of the ECHR. 236 Conversely, American courts view privacy rights as fundamental and justiciable interests. Both nations have histories that emphasize individual right
and liberty. The apparent difference in means (if not ends) can be explained by realizing that the British and American courts have developed
into functionally different institutions. 237 Neither of these institutions,
however, adequately and predictably vindicate the autonomy interests of
their citizens. In Britain, minority groups are denied a domestic forum
in which to challenge laws that unduly interfere with their private lives.
In the United States, citizens who claim the right of privacy have little
certainty with regard to the scope of the right or the standards a court
will use to evaluate their claim.
A. A Right of Privacy Is Necessary in the United States' Legal System
The use of tradition as a constitutional touchstone transforms the
individual claim of a right of privacy into a liberty interest bestowed on
the individual by the community. Viewed in this way, the right of privacy is not a "right to be ungoverned," but rather a right to be partially
"self-governing" in matters related to the core of who we are and what
we aspire to be and do.
Some British commentators view American privacy law as an anarchistic passion to be ungoverned somehow not yet bred out of the nation.238 This British view may be partially correct. A privacy right rests
upon an individualistic concept of society, sometimes manifested in the
unfortunate extreme "each man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost. ' 239 The United States tradition emphasizes the benefits of selfgovernment-the right and the responsibility of the individual to think
for himself in order to determine the best life course. Our society recognizes that belief in a summum bonum, a best life, does not mean that any
one person or group of persons has been blessed with perfect knowledge
of it. The free exercise of reason, coupled with the trial and error process
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes 21-34, 172-73 and accompanying text.
See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 35-41.
YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 19.
R. HIxsON, supra note 18, at xv.
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of experience, may be the only way for the individual and the community
to work toward happiness. 24° Privacy rights play a key role in this process because they protect the process of self-definition. Self-definition
through the exercise of personal autonomy is a gradual process. In making moral choices and in living with the consequences, reason and experiindividual toward greater self-knowledge and
ence move the
241
understanding.
Recognizing the utility of privacy as an end does not provide a
means for securing personal autonomy. For privacy rights to be effective, their scope and application must allow individuals to recognize the
activities that are within the aegis of the right. Predictability is lost when
the parameters of a right are ill-defined.
Although privacy adjudication presently lacks needed predictability,
there are several avenues by which the scope of the privacy right can be
delineated. Justice Scalia's approach seeks to define privacy by arbitrarily limiting the scope of the privacy right. 242 Conversely, the British protect some privacy interests, but only on an ad hoc basis. Both of these
approaches have their failings. A piecemeal approach to the vindication
of privacy interests is insufficient because many issues will remain unresolved. 24 3 Arbitrarily limiting the objects of a broadly crafted privacy
right seriously undervalues the benefits of personal autonomy, ceding
residual power not with the people, but with the government. There is
an alternative to choosing between either a narrow but specific right of
privacy or a vague but inclusive privacy right. A return to the American
tradition of liberty, evidenced in Meyer, 244 Pierce,24 5 and Moore v. City of
240. For an example of this kind of natural law reasoning, the writings of Thomas Jefferson are
illustrative:
Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was to be formed to this object. He
was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this.... [The moral sense]
may be strengthened by exercise, as may any limb of the body.... Fix reason firmly in her
seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), reprintedin THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 423, 424-25 (M. Peterson ed. 1985).
241. "The unexamined life is no life for a human being." PLATO, Apology, in 1 DIALOGUES OF
PLATO *38a (13.Jowett Trans. 1953). An Enlightenment notion ofpre-social rights seems to survive
in the United States. See R. HixsON, supra note 18, at 97-102. Americans believe that they have a
right to retain interests as against both the government and the community. The attitude of Americans toward their legislatures exemplifies this belief. Americans do not want the government to
become a sort ofcollectiveparenspatriae.See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 270-71;
see also 311-15.
242. This is precisely what Justice Scalia attempts to do in his opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
243. Ironically, although not specifically mentioning the United States, the British point out this
defect in the YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 197-98.
244. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
245. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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East Cleveland,246 but not in Bowers 247 or Michael H.,248 could provide
the necessary framework through which to vindicate privacy rights consistently and predictably. 249 The relevant tradition derives from the Enlightenment tradition that imbued the founding of the Republic-a
tradition of intellectual independence and personal autonomy, rather
than one of direct government supervision of the minutiae of one's private life.
Because notions of privacy are related to notions of autonomy, a
legally cognizable privacy interest against the government is unexceptional. Americans' predisposition to rely on rights against the government may also be explained, in part, by the pluralistic nature of the
populace. A nation of immigrants, the United States welcomed settlers
from different nations, races, and religions. As a result, legislatures can
be mistrusted, particularly by minorities who feel either unrepresented or
underrepresented by a particular body. 250 Minority interests rely on the
courts to vindicate the majoritarian promises of liberty, endangered by
majoritarian legislation. A small minority probably cannot convince a
legislature to protect its interests. Thus minorities view the countermajoritarian courts, which at the federal level do not specifically answer
to any interest group, as the best potential means of securing relief.
I advocate a privacy law that focuses on tradition, but also on substantial reliance on strict observation of process. 251 The right of privacy
represents a cornucopia of distinct interests, organized under the rubric
of "privacy. '252 Whether a particular interest is or is not accorded protected status is not as important as the existence of the privacy right
itself. Ultimately the point is not that "X" is or is not a privacy right,
but rather that the American courts are prepared to examine the question on its merits. 253 From this perspective Roe's process approach best
246. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
247. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
248. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

249. I am not suggesting that tradition be used as a means of imposing a narrow set of values.
Rather, if tradition is used to define areas where the community has in practice deferred to individual choice, it may provide a useful limiting principle. To the extent that "tradition" is used to
impose a "motherhood and apple pie" morality directly upon the population through the evisceration of "liberty" interests, the effect is unwarranted and pernicious.
250. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 312-15.
251. See supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
252. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (a survey of various rights of privacy found
by the Supreme Court under various constitutional amendments). This is also exemplified in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) where the court attempts (without success) to spell out the
contours of a defined and limited interest. See also A. WESTIN,PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 350, 35960, 365-69 (1967).

253. Webster is a good example. The Court entertained the privacy claim, but after applying the
balancing test enunciated in Roe came down on the side of the state interest, at least with respect to
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vindicates legitimate privacy claims while Michael H. ignores the citizen's right to force government to justify its acts.
The problem of predictability remains. The Griswold line of cases
failed to specify with any cogency how or when the compelling state in-

terest balancing test is to be applied. Although the concept of "liberty"
certainly suggests some sphere of autonomy, courts struggle to identify

"fundamental interests" and to balance them against the "compelling
state interests. '25 4 Thus the United States has failed to draw clear lines
so that citizens may live their daily lives secure in the knowledge that
their acts are legal.
The renewed use of tradition by the Supreme Court to validate privacy interests could potentially help delimit the right of privacy. 255 If the
federal courts would consistently apply the two step approach advocated
by this Note, 25 6 then the problem of predictability would be substantially
resolved. The fundamental problem lies in the determination of the relationship between individual autonomy and self-definition on the one
hand, and the community's perceived need to control individuals to protect itself and its sense of well-being on the other. Nevertheless, the federal courts can and should surmount this difficulty.
B. BritainAlso Needs a Right of Privacy
Britain should adopt a right of privacy in its domestic law. If Parliament will not act, then the courts should assert themselves more forcefully through the common law. 257 There are two reasons for this
conclusion. First, large areas of personal autonomy are hostage to parliathe particular Missouri statutes in question. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3056-58 (1989). One must bear two things in mind in the wake of Webster: First, the privacy
balancing test has survived the Reagan Court, and is an accepted doctrine of American jurisprudence, and second, that whether a particular action or forbearance is cognizable as a privacy right is
not always an easy question for the present court. See supra notes 208-34 and accompanying text.
254. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949
(1976) (privacy is "a right to independence in making certain kinds of important decisions").
255. R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 10-23; YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 19. See supra
notes 206-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential dangers in using tradition as
the source of privacy rights.
256. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
257. The easiest way for the courts to accomplish this task would be to create a common law
right that parallels article 8. The British judiciary could not unilaterally incorporate article 8 per se
consistently with the present state of British constitutional law. See supra note 122; Dworkin, Pdvacy and the Law, in PRiVACy, supra note 14, at 133. For example, Lord Denning has said, "It
[article 8] is so wide as to be incapable of practical application." R. v. Chief Immigration Officer,
Heathrow Airport, exparte Bibi, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979, 984; see also R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 178
(only benefit of article 8 is its "catalytic effect on our legislators in the event of an adverse ruling by
the European court").
Another consideration is the general contempt which the domestic courts of Great Britain have
for the European Court, which gives "mere opinions" rather than holdings predicated on law. See
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mentary fiat under the present state of the law. Second, Britain has an
international obligation under the ECHR to vindicate a right of privacy

pursuant to article

8.258

Yet, for many reasons, it is unlikely that Britain

will adopt a right of privacy in the immediate future.
Rights exist only if the relevant decisionmakers affirmatively decide
to confer a power of decision back to the community. For a right of

autonomy to exist, the community must adopt it through Parliament.
One of the principal problems is the British legal system's emphasis on

predictability, stability, and the maintenance of the distinction between
the law as it is from the law as it ought to be. 259 If Parliament is fairly

elected and entirely representative, then individual claims to be privileged from governance are selfish, if not absurd.
However, the British Parliament may decide questions of policy free
from constitutional constraints. 260 Positivism-the idea that the law
must be applied as it is-leads courts to apply the law before them without questioning the purposes that the law is meant to serve. For better or
worse, positivism is one of the theoretical bulwarks for the supremacy of

Parliament. 261 Positivists attempt to separate law and morality at the
time laws are applied. Thus, Parliament may consider ethical matters
when passing a law, but this is the only time when morality should enter

into the consideration of legal consequences. Legal positivists generally
are unreceptive to the idea that an act of Parliament, passed properly and
clear in all of its provisions, should be unenforced by the courts because
it offends some individual's right of privacy-a right unexpressed at law,
262
and self-evident in nature.

Although divorcing law from morality at the time courts actually
apply laws is one way to approach privacy questions, this approach ultimately may be more problematic than the American substantive approach to privacy law. 263 It requires something of a leap of faith, if one
P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 423. As such, they are theoretically not entitled to any
more deference from the courts than are anyone else's opinion.
258. "It is worth emphasising [sic] that the E.C.H.RL envisages recourse to its Commission and
Court as a last resort for aggrieved individuals." Dowrick, supra note 25, at 887-88. Of course, the
ECHR machinery is the first resort for British citizens arguing article 8 or any other substantive
right not having an analogue in domestic British law.
259. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 148-50; see also H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 120 (1945) (discussing generally the tension between the "ought" and the
"is" in legal order).
260. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 227, 257-63, 266 (developing the historical
relationship between the British constitutional framework, including Parliamentary supremacy, and
legal positivism).
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 224; R. HIXSON, supra note 18, at 93-104.
263. Comment, Abortion and Statutory Interpretation, LAW & JUSICE, Spring 1982, at 2, 3.
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lives in a pluralistic society (which Britain is rapidly becoming), to presume Parliament correctly resolves all issues when legislating.
A right of privacy in Britain will come, if at all, from one of the

international conventions. 264 Britain could adopt a right of privacy
either through a Parliamentary Act that domestically recognizes the
ECHR or through the aggressive use of the principles enunciated in
ECHR by the EEC. A narrowly defined parliamentary adoption of a
right of privacy, particularly as against the government, would not cause

irreparable harm to the British constitutional framework and would benefit substantially the growing minorities within Britain.
Parliament has, of course, specifically recognized some privacy in-

terests through limited statutory enactments. In repealing the "sinlaws," Parliament has applied a kind of "compelling state interest" test,
without expressly recognizing an individual privacy right. For example,
in the Wolfenden Report on Homosexuality, the Committee approached

the question of government regulation not in terms of privacy or individual right, but rather in terms of whether consensual sexual behavior was

any concern of the state. 265 However, this built-in legislative restraint
does not always succeed in protecting arguable privacy rights--especially
266
when state security or law enforcement is at stake.
264. As a result of positivist legal philosophy, "[s]tatutes in the United Kingdom require greater
specificity to compensate for the limited judicial role." W. PRATT, supra note 23, at 207. A statute
that purported to create a general right of privacy would be an anomaly in the British system of
government. Traditional institutional roles also work against the creation of a right of privacy. The
present judiciary has neither the disposition nor the administrative resources to police a broad right
of privacy. See P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 279-83; W. PRATr, supra note 23, at
206-07. In the United States, judges generally have a battery of clerks and secretaries, in addition to
libraries and docket clerks. Further, the increasing use of magistrates and staff attorneys suggests
that chambers in the United States are becoming mini-bureaucracies. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 20, at 281-82. In contrast, judges in Great Britain lack the clerks, secretaries, and libraries needed to assume a quasi-legislative function. Id. at 279-81.
265. W. PRATT, supra note 23, at 126 n.105, 131; REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON HoMosEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, CMND. No. 247 [hereinafter Wolfenden Committee].
266. Professor Street criticized the lack of entrenched rights in Britain:
The legal concept of liberty is that there are residual areas... where man is free to act as
he likes without being regulated by law.... More than that, in a system like the American,
the Constitution is a special law, one that cannot be changed except by a special procedure
different from that for ordinary laws. Was it a good thing that all the restraints on freedom
contained in the Official Secrets Act of 1911 were rushed through the House of Commons
in one day in time of peace as if they were matters of no moment, the citizen no doubt
unaware of that curtailment of his liberty which was thereby being effected? Parliamentary
sovereignty in Britain ensures that Parliament can change any law, however fundamental,
by the same process as, say, a law which increases the amount which a local authority may
charge for dustbins.
H. STREET, supra note 22, at 284-85. See supra notes 67-73, 80-83 and accompanying text. See
Atlas, supra note 24, at 36, col. 1 ("To an American, accustomed to the defense of individual rights
afforded by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the power concentrated in the hands of the
British Government is extraordinary.").
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A communitarian ideal may work well in a unitary and homogeneous society, but as Britain becomes more pluralistic, it will be forced to
rethink its approach to entrenching individual rights against parliamentary abrogation. Historically, British jurisprudence has not been receptive to the idea of rights existing free and clear of parliamentary sanction.
Professor Raymond Wacks has noted the problem with this approach:
"Our law is manifestly inadequate to protect the individual against various attacks made, often in the name of progress, order or liberty, upon
'267
his personality.
The benefit secured by the British approach is the certainty with
which individuals know the parameters of legal sanctions and individual
right. 268 However, the use of tradition could provide meaningful guidance in limiting a British right of privacy. 269 Furthermore, we must

question whether we want to value certainty above liberty. 270 The British systems' reliance on parliamentary reform keeps the system neat and
tidy, but it also results in individual cases of injustice. Even though the
American approach lacks order, rules, and definition, its flexibility allows
for immediate response to individual injustice. Both systems could benefit from an increased reliance on each society's traditions of liberty to
cabin the right of privacy.
It may be that privacy is not a pressing social concern because the
traditions and habits of British society do not require the legal vindication of such interests. For generations, tradition and social mores operated to guarantee some modicum of personal autonomy. According to
Professor Alan Westin, "The English accomplish with reserve what the
'271
Germans require doors, walls, and trespass rules to enforce.
Although legal guarantees are not always the only way to achieve a desirable social end, they sometimes are the surest means. English society
historically has been a small, homogeneous population, with strong family structure, a class system, public support of the government, and an
267. R. WACKS, supra note 2, at 21.
268. P. ATIYAH & 1L SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 133-41.
269. The jurisprudence of the European Court and the EEC already incorporates the traditions

of the western European nations. See supra notes 115-20 (European Court) and 168-70 (EEC) and
accompanying text; see generally supra notes 227-35 (describing how tradition could provide mean-

ingful guidance to United States courts).
270. Professor Street observed:
[It will be no bad thing for [the reader] to consider whether [Britain is] better off without a

constitution, relying on the ordinary Courts to minimize as much as is reasonable any
specific encroachments on our freedom. Does the practical, piecemeal improvisation suit

us better than the formal high-sounding manifesto? Or do we pay too high a price in more
uncertainty about the precise limits of our freedom?
H. STREET, supra note 22, at 11. Street strongly implies that Britain needs to rethink its reliance on
parliamentary restraint. Id. at 283-89.
271. A. WESTIN, supra note 252, at 29.
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elite system of education. 272 Consequently, the force of tradition remains
strong in Britain. Granting the validity of these observations, the question of the rights of individual minorities is still open. English society is
changing, and the social strictures that once were sufficient may no
longer suffice to protect liberty. 273 Minority members of British society
must be provided with a procedural means of asserting their autonomy
claims against the community of which they are a part. This is the essence of a truly free society.
C.

Conclusion

Autonomy interests are vindicated against government encroachment, in part, through the legal constraint of privacy rights. If the British are formalistic and miserly in conferring privacy rights on
individuals, then Americans are imprecise to the point of absurdity in
defining an individual's privacy rights. Taken to its logical extreme, a
"right to be let alone" ultimately is the right to be ungoverned. 274 No
orderly society could survive the recognition of such an absolute right of
privacy. The extent to which a community will tolerate deviant behavior
must ultimately be related to the maintenance of a sense of well being in
the community. If the use of illicit drugs, or abuse of women or children,
were claimed as privacy rights, then the accompanying disquietude visited upon the community would rend the social fabric asunder. The
existence of a social compact cannot be squared with absolute individual
autonomy. Conversely, however, the demands of the community cannot
unduly impinge on the individual's ability to be self-defining-at least in
some respects. Thus the proper measuring stick for the effectiveness of
any governmental regime is the extent to which personal liberty is maximized in a given nation. Both the United States and Great Britain have
had relative successes and relative failures in their approaches to the protection of privacy.
The problem that any government faces is one of drawing lines between competing interests-those of the community in regulating and
defining itself through custom and law, and that of the individual in
maintaining vital elements of personality and self. Although this prob272. See id. at 26.
273. As one contemporary British writer noted:
The old British complacency [regarding the lack of a written constitution] may never have
been justified. Today, it is clearly quite unjustified.... What is needed, if only somebody
can find the recipe, is a charter of rights that entrenches our liberties without suggesting
that everything worth having must somehow be among them.
Ryan, supra note 56, at 8, cols. 1-2.
274. Schneider, State-InterestAnalysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on
the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1988, at 79, 86-87.
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lem does not lend itself to a simple and precise answer, community traditions of individual liberty are a safe starting point. The closing
paragraph from one of the minority reports filed by the Younger Committee summarizes the interests motivating the discussion of the legal
and social necessity of privacy rights, and provides a fitting conclusion:
Somehow I find all the excuses [by the majority for rejecting a general
right of privacy] inadequate. I prefer a society where a zeal for truth is
matched by compassion and where even the weakest of our fellow citizens knows that he can call upon the law in his unequal fight with
those powerful interests, including the government, who abuse his
275
freedom.

The protection a society affords individual autonomy reflects whether it
is truly free; citizens should remain ever vigilant, lest they find their government omnipresent.
Ronald J Krotoszynski, Jr.

275. YOUNGER REPORT, supra note 15, at 212 (minority report of A. W. Lyon). It is my hope
that this Note helps provide a technical understanding of the role of privacy law in Britain, and also,
through a comparison with U.S. privacy law, some insight into the systemic differences that exist
between the two nations. More fundamentally,. however, I hope that the tension which exists between governance and autonomy is made clear, for it is the agon between self and community which
drives privacy law. Where and how to draw lines respecting legitimate claims of autonomy is beyond my abilities. Let it suffice to say that communities, politicians, and most importantly judges,
must draw this line on a daily basis. However, I do believe that courts should consider a community's traditions of deference to individual decision-making when citizens challenge government regulations of their daily lives. In balancing the autonomy of the individual against the needs of the
community, the tenor of the polis is struck, thus, the act is a delicate one whose repercussions will
have real affects on both the community and the individual.

